

EMMANUEL LEVINAS' ETHICS OF RESPONSIBILITY AS A FOUNDATION FOR ETHICAL RELATION

Author: Gona Akirso Asaro.

Co-authors: Dr. Kimani Sabas and Rev. Dr. Kenneth Makokha.

The Catholic University of Eastern Africa, P.O. Box 62157-00200, Nairobi-Kenya.

DOI : <https://doi.org/10.56293/IJASR.2022.5417>

IJASR 2022  
VOLUME 5  
ISSUE 4 JULY – AUGUST

ISSN: 2581-7876

**Abstract:** In the contemporary society, more ever than before, humanity is an exigent need of the ethics of responsibility. This article presents Emmanuel Levinas' ethics of responsibility as a foundation for ethical relation. Ethics of responsibility essentially calls for morality, which creates a room for the other and indispensable to eschewing the "I" ascendancy. Everyone is morally responsible for his or her neighbour, who is "the Other" either particular or "the third Party." To be human is to be responsible. "The Other" is a key concept in the vocabulary of Levinas and the starting point of his philosophy of ethics. Ethics of responsibility commands the human race to respect the alterity, dignity, rights, and otherness of the Other through ethical relation despite his or her physical dynamics. It is a responsibility that postulates asymmetrical sociality, face-to-face loving encounter, ethical substitution and ethical justice as a paramount to ethical relation in contemporary broken society.

**Keywords:** Morality, The Other, The Third Party, Alterity, Ethical responsibility, Ethical relation, Asymmetrical sociality, Face-to-face encounter, Ethical substitution and Ethical justice.

### Introduction

Levinas, through his assiduous and determined effort revealed the danger of predominant subject matter of the western philosophical tradition, which accentuates on the Same rebuffing the Other, and/or the Self conceptualizing the Other. He experienced the hazardous phenomena of the horror of war, inhumanness of the Same towards the other human person. These predicaments made him to find out possibility of philosophizing otherwise with an eye to defend the Other and preserve his alterity and otherness. He thus presents ethical responsibility as a foundation and solid vital force for understanding and establishing a genuine face-to-face ethical interpersonal relationship. It is therefore indispensable not to underestimate ethical responsibility that enhances a healthy phenomenon of sociality based on solicitude, ethical empathy, recognition, authentic solidarity, justice, equality, and genuine communication.

### 1.1 Defining Ethical Responsibility

It is evident that, ethics, in ancient time, was primarily accredited with inquiring the substantial question, "How should human person live?" or "what is the good life for human persons?" Whereas Enlightenment morality is so often depicted as being engaged in answering the question, "what ought I do?"<sup>1</sup> It is regarded as the study of the person's responsibilities in the light of urge to self-actualization, pursuing better life fulfilment of the self.<sup>2</sup> For Levinas, human subject is a hostage to the imposed responsibility towards the other. It is not permissible to say this or that is none of my business.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Diane Perpich, *The Ethics of Emmanuel Levinas*, Edited by Mieke Bal and Hent de Vries, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), 3.

<sup>2</sup>Luciano Mattei-P. Wambua, *A Guide to Christian Ethics and Formation in Moral Maturity, Introduction to Ethics*, (Nairobi: The Catholic University of Eastern Africa Press, 2000), 86.

<sup>3</sup>Perpich, *The Ethics of Emmanuel Levinas*, xiv.

Levinas concedes that, western philosophical thought has been dominated by the reduction of the other by enhancing and giving more concern for the egocentric subjectivity or for-itself. However, his ethics redefines subjectivity from self-directed and self-centredness to a responsibility for the other.<sup>4</sup> He moves out from common understanding of ethics in that a person is responsible for what he does oneself to the other person. He says, responsibility is predominantly for the other person,<sup>5</sup> and hence understood in the context of the other.<sup>6</sup> No human person is created to live for oneself but rather in an ethical relation with the other. Levinas further argues that, “Subjectivity is not for itself; it is once again, initially for the Other. ... In principle the I does not pull itself out of its “first person;” it supports the world. Constituting itself in the various movement wherein being responsible for the other devolves on it.”<sup>7</sup>

### 1.2 Levinas' Notion of Face-to-Face Human Ethical Encounter

This phenomenology of the Face is an archetype and pivotal concept of the other person in Levinas philosophical thought. The face is that of the other thus it is straightaway ethical. Nevertheless this face is not only what we can perceive because it is not an object. It is he whose appearing is also an appeal or a command given to our responsibility in ethical relation. To encounter a face is straightaway to hear a demand and an order<sup>8</sup> which hails from the other.

The relation to the face although is always a relation to the face of a particular individual person who confronts the self, it is simultaneously multiple in so far as it appertain to other people. While the ethical encounter between the same and the other is an individual encounter and humanity turn up from the face of the other.<sup>9</sup> Levinas insists that the face-to-face is a final and irreducible relation which makes possible the multiplicity and profusion of society. Thus, social relationships only come about through an act of self-transcendence.<sup>10</sup> The face-to-face relation is the relation in which the individual person relates to the other as other and the other relates to him as other in direct address.<sup>11</sup>

The result of face-to-face encounter is that the ego finds in an ethical relationship in which it is divested of its egoism and invited to the serious work of goodness and responsibility. The anecdote of “I meets other” is only to emphasise question of ethical force of an encounter that issues in a summons to responsibility.<sup>12</sup> Levinas, looking into the faces of persons who are helpless, asks us to imagine the other in biblical languages as “the stranger, the widow, or the orphan” who is begging for help and our hearts go out to them for empathic care, feeling obligated to “tear the bread from our mouth to nourish the other.”<sup>13</sup>

### 1.3 Asymmetrical and Irreversible Sociality

In asymmetrical sociality the Other is specifically understood as underprivileged, powerless, helpless, has no enough resources to sustain itself while the Same has all the above mentioned. Levinas insists that “the difference in height that characterizes the relationship between the same and other is one that is by definition asymmetrical. The inaccessible height of the other, revealed in metaphysical desire, attests to the asymmetrical nature of the encounter.

<sup>4</sup>Emmanuel Levinas, *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence*, translated by AlphonsoLingis, (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1988), 103.

<sup>5</sup>Emmanuel Levinas, *Ethics and Infinity, Conversations with Philippe Nemo*, translated by Richard A. Cohen, (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1982), 96.

<sup>6</sup>Levinas, *Ethics and Infinity, Conversations with Philippe Nemo*, 95.

<sup>7</sup>Levinas, *Ethics and Infinity, Conversations with Philippe Nemo*, 99-100.

<sup>8</sup>Perpich, *The Ethics of Emmanuel Levinas*, 50-51.

<sup>9</sup>Emmanuel Levinas, *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*, translated by AlphonsoLingis, (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969), 212-214.

<sup>10</sup>Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, *The Self and the Other: The Irreducible Other, Irreducible Element in Man, Part 1, the Crisis of Man*, (Holland: Springer Science +Business Media Dordrecht, 1977), 24.

<sup>11</sup>Brian Schroeder and Silvia Benso, *Levinas and the Ancients*, (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2008), 32.

<sup>12</sup>Perpich, *The Ethics of Emmanuel Levinas*, 79.

<sup>13</sup>Joshua James Shaw, *Emmanuel Levinas on the Priority of Ethics: Putting Ethics First*, (New York: Cambria Press, 2008), xxiv.

The other is always encountered in a situation in which the self is “above” the other and the Other “below” the self.”<sup>14</sup>

After recognizing the delinquency that reversible or reciprocal encounters leads to, Levinas asserted that:

In the very heart of the relationship with the other that characterizes our social life, alterity appears as non-reciprocal relationship—that is, as contrasting strongly with contemporaneity. The other is not only an alter ego: the Other is what I myself am not. The Other is this not because of the other’s character, or physiognomy, or psychology, but because of the Other’s very alterity. The Other is, therefore, the weak, “the poor, the widow and the orphan,” whereas I am the rich or the powerful. It can be said that intersubjective space is not symmetrical. The exteriority of the other is not simply due to the space that separates what remains identical through the concept, nor is it due to any difference the concept would manifest through spatial exteriority...The relationship with alterity is neither spatial nor conceptual.<sup>15</sup>

Irreversibility does not only mean that the same goes unto the other differently than the other to the same. That eventuality and possibility does not enter into account because the radical separation between the same and the other means precisely that it is impossible to place oneself outside the correlation between the same and the other. The same and the other then would be reunited under one gaze, and the absolute distance that separates them filled in<sup>16</sup> through asymmetrical relation.

## 1.4 Ethical Substitution

Ethical substitution, according to Levinas, is one-for-the-other.<sup>17</sup> It is based on subjectivity, which is itself on the relation between subject and the “other.” Substituting the other, in Levinas, changes from another level of understanding the other to the position of the other.<sup>18</sup> According to him, to ethically substitute oneself does not amount to putting oneself in the place of the other man in order to feel what he feels. The self does not become the other, or if he be destitute and desperate, that is the courage of such a trial. Ethical substitution rather entails bringing comfort by associating ourselves with the essential weakness and finitude of the other. It is to bear our neighbour’s burden while sacrificing one’s interestedness and complacency-in-being, which turns into responsibility for the other.<sup>19</sup>

In the strict sense, through ethical substitution humanity finds its definition that “to be human is to suffer for the Other.”<sup>20</sup> The prevalence of the suffering other is the very interconnection of human subjectivity which can be raised to extent as a supreme ethical principle.<sup>21</sup> Levinas ethical responsibility thus demands for the compassionate response to the vulnerable, and suffering other.<sup>22</sup>

Levinas postulates that responsibility before the other challenges the individual to the point of being hostage to the other, and for substitution. To be responsible before another person is to answer to the appeal by which he approaches. It is to put oneself in his place, not to observe oneself from without, but to bear the burden of his

---

<sup>14</sup>Robert Bernasconi and Simon Critchley, (eds.), Levinas, “Wholly Otherwise,” In *Re-Reading Levinas*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991), 6.

<sup>15</sup>Emmanuel Levinas, *Time and the Other*, translated by Richard A. Cohen, (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1987), 84.

<sup>16</sup>Levinas, *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*, 35-36.

<sup>17</sup>Adriaan T. Peperzak, Simon Critchley, and R. Bernasconi, *Emmanuel Levinas Basic Philosophical Writings*, (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1996), 79.

<sup>18</sup>Hamed Rastaei and Ahad Faramaz Gharamaleki, “Substitution,” In Levinas and Replacement in Sympathy: Two Different Approaches to Facing the Other. *Journal of Philosophical Theological Research* 4, 23(2021), 6. Doi:10.22091/jptr.2021.7006.2549.

<sup>19</sup>Emmanuel Levinas, *Is It Righteous to Be? Interviews with Emmanuel Levinas*, Edited by Jill Robbins, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), 228.

<sup>20</sup>Levinas, *Is It Righteous to Be?* 188.

<sup>21</sup>Emmanuel Levinas, “Useless Suffering,” In *Entre Nous: Thinking for-the-Other*, translated by M. Smith and B. Harshav, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 94.

<sup>22</sup>William Edelglas, “Levinas on Suffering and Compassion” *Sophia*, Ashgate Publishing Limited, 45(2) October 2006, 43. Doi 10.1007/BF02782480.

existence and supply for its wants.<sup>23</sup> It is however, not abandonment of oneself, or to be alienated and slave to the other, but a renunciation of oneself completely to be responsible for the other. This essential identity is brought out by ethical responsibility and is at the service of the other.<sup>24</sup> Therefore, Levinas requests every person to put itself in the place of another. In doing so; he says, one becomes a subject in the physical nature of being hostage to the other.<sup>25</sup>

### 1.5 Love of the Neighbour Expressed in Charity

Levinas addressing the love of the other fellow-man most often means to accentuate the aspects of charity and sacrifice characteristic of responsibility and substitution rather than a preferential relationship of intimacy.<sup>26</sup> No human or inter-human relationship can be enacted outside economy; no other can be approached with empty hands and closed home.<sup>27</sup> For this reason, the ethical truth in ethical love centred on cordiality is that:

It is not a gift of the heart, but the bread from one's mouth, of one's mouthful of bread. It is the openness, not only of one's pocketbook, but of the doors of one's home, a sharing of your bread with the famished; a "welcoming of the wretched into your house."<sup>28</sup>

Levinas insists on the concrete and material nature of a person's responsibility, oftentimes affirming that the other's material needs are his spiritual needs and noting that responsibility requires that he takes the bread from mouth in order to give to the other.<sup>29</sup>

To be oneself, otherwise than self, to be dis-interested, is to bear the wretchedness and bankruptcy of the other, even the responsibility that the other can have for the self. In the same scheme, to be oneself is the state of being a hostage, is always to have one degree of responsibility, the responsibility for the responsibility of the other.<sup>30</sup> The responsibility we have for one in which the societies we live in also have for every person around us and every person around them.<sup>31</sup> Ethical relation is the very essence of the self. Whenever the self affirms itself, its affirmation is with the existence of the other person.<sup>32</sup>

Love for the other in responsibility is a genuine desire to develop an ethical inter-human relation between the same and the other. It is a desire to approach the "naked and indigent" to gratify its need without reducing it to the same.<sup>33</sup> The need is not merely material or physical equipment; if it so, then, there might be a possibility of using the poor as means to once hidden agenda. The other person, the neighbour can never be treated as an object and subsumed to the selfish interest of the ego. The intentionality of love seeks the other person in his suffering and penniless, assumes the suffering and need of the other with due deference. Responsibility when maintained by love offers the coherence and coexistence among persons.<sup>34</sup>

Conclusively, a loving and ethical responsibility is a foundation for Same-Other relation as a remedy for "the vast amounts of human suffering and violence in the world. The world is continually suffering under the manifestations of inhuman behaviour, which is ethically questioning our human "being-ness."<sup>35</sup> The Same-Other relation then

<sup>23</sup>Levinas, *Otherwise than Being, Or Beyond Essence*, xx.

<sup>24</sup>Levinas, *Otherwise than Being, Or Beyond Essence*, 68-69.

<sup>25</sup>Sean Hand, *The Levinas Readers*, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 88.

<sup>26</sup>Brain Treanor, *Aspects of Alterity: Levinas, Marcel and Contemporary Debate*, (New York: Fordham University Press, 2006), 48.

<sup>27</sup>Levinas, *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*, 172.

<sup>28</sup>Levinas, *Otherwise than Being, Or Beyond Essence*, 37.

<sup>29</sup>Richard Kearney, *States of Mind: Dialogues with Contemporary Thinkers*, (New York: NYU Press, 1995), 190.

<sup>30</sup>Levinas, *Otherwise than Being, Or Beyond Essence*, 117.

<sup>31</sup>Gary Ray, Sunshine, "Hope as a Strategy: Messianism in the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas," (2019). *Electronic Theses and Dissertations.1625.*, 23. <https://digitalcommons.du.edu/etd/1625>.

<sup>32</sup>Paul A. Schilp and Maurice S. Friedman, (eds.), *The Philosophy of Martin Buber*, (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1967), 139.

<sup>33</sup>Edith Wyschogrod, *Emmanuel Levinas: The Problem of Ethical metaphysics*, vol.I, (MartinusNijhoff: The Hague, 1974), 57-58.

<sup>34</sup>Wyschogrod, *Emmanuel Levinas: The Problem of Ethical metaphysics*, vol.1, 116.

<sup>35</sup>Kolano, *We-For The Other: Solidarity as Enactment of Ethical - Empathetic Subjectivity: An Analysis of the Philosophical Projects of Emmanuel Levinas and Edith Stein, and the Concept of Solidarity*, xiii-xiv.

emerges when one enters into a relation with the other by grasping him as a human being he/she is.<sup>36</sup> Therefore responsibility for the other to create ethical relation between people is blatantly pertinent and a dire necessity to human life on earth today.

## 1.6 Responsibility Corresponds with Ethical Justice

The ethical relationship is asymmetrical and irreversible; however, the relationship in justice opens a field wherein the self may take itself into consideration.<sup>37</sup> The necessity of justice, a fair way of dealing with the unfairness brought about by inability to meet the infinite demands of self's responsibility.<sup>38</sup> Justice is possible only if it is founded on the original asymmetry of the face-to-face. Justice must be founded on the original asymmetry of responsibility. The responsibility for the other who stands before the self demands for justice which enlightens the self's concern for justice, its responsibility to all human beings.<sup>39</sup>

### 1.6.1 Relationship Between Justice, Charity and Polity

The ethical and charity (ethical responsibility) are the two amalgamated and concurrent facets that operate together. Levinas argues that, "justice itself is born of charity. They can seem alien when they are presented as successive stages; in reality they are inseparable and simultaneous."<sup>40</sup> In the same respect, he further notes that charity is impossible without justice and that justice is warped without charity.<sup>41</sup>

Charity here has a biblical correspondence for the term "Agape" as selfless love. Hence, to claim the priority of charity is actually refers to the priority of the ethical.<sup>42</sup> If charity concentrates only on individual or particular groups, justice however, demands the charity to look beyond the individual other to consider the others implicated in every inter-human-encounter. Responsibility is the original relation that justice must take as its guide if it is to be just.<sup>43</sup> Again, love must always watch over justice<sup>44</sup> for they are concomitant in building the Same-other encounter. Levinas persistence on self's ethical responsibility for the other functions as a measure of legitimacy for every social, economic, and political arrangement in every state. It is absolutely necessary to accept ethics as the primary politics so that the ethical responsibility, one-for-the-other should be around the constitution of the state.<sup>45</sup> Levinas' primary politics is a paramount for any institution but predominantly for government to exceedingly consider the factual, concrete and existential demands of the humanity before establishing any laws, principles, structures, etc.; therefore there would be ethical justice and ethical equality predicated on ethical responsibility for mankind.

A human society is possible only on the basis of a law of the government which considers the humanity as its first and deepest principle. It is only on the basis of a fundamental ethical relation of justice through which that otherness can indeed be recognized, and that recognition concretized.<sup>46</sup> This discloses that, man's irrevocable humanity should be definitely respected which is prior to anything else. Justice implies also to economic impartiality, humanitarian and egalitarianism.

<sup>36</sup>Petter Atterton, Mathew Calarco and Maurice Friedman, (eds.), *Levinas and Buber: Dialogue and Difference*, (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: Duquesne University Press, 2004), 107.

<sup>37</sup>Levinas, *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*, 210.

<sup>38</sup>Treanor, *Aspects of Alterity: Levinas, Marcel and Contemporary Debate*, 49.

<sup>39</sup>Treanor, *Aspects of Alterity: Levinas, Marcel and Contemporary Debate*, 50.

<sup>40</sup>Emmanuel Levinas, "Philosophy, Justice and Love," In *Entre Nous: On Thinking-for-the-Other*, translated by Michael B. Smith and Barbara Harshav, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 104.

<sup>41</sup>Levinas, "Philosophy, Justice and Love," 121.

<sup>42</sup>Ramona Rat, "Uncommon Sociality: Thinking Sociality with Levinas," *Soderton Philosophical Studies* 155.

<sup>43</sup>Treanor, *Aspects of Alterity: Levinas, Marcel and Contemporary Debate*, 51.

<sup>44</sup>Levinas, "Philosophy, Justice and Love," 108.

<sup>45</sup>Victoria Tamasbel-Birgani, *Emmanuel Levinas and the Politics of Non-Violence*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014), 33.

<sup>46</sup>Roger Burggraeve, *The Wisdom of Love in the Service of Love: Emmanuel Levinas on Justice, Peace, and Human Rights*, (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2002), 106.

### 1.6.2 Justice Implies Ethical Freedom

Justice only has meaning if it retains the spirit of dis-interestedness which animates the idea of responsibility for the other man.<sup>47</sup> Responsibility for the other is about human fraternity, and it is prior to freedom<sup>48</sup> because before doing anything by using his freedom someone needs to be responsible prior to the action or whatever he is going to do. The other in his “destitution and nudity and in its facial expression presents me with the ethical command “thou shall not kill.”<sup>49</sup> The other challenges the self to question its (self’s) freedom when he encounters it face-to-face. Justice therefore is, whether someone is going to dehumanize, encroach upon or undermine the other through his choices.

### 1.7 Responsibility to “the Third Person”

The other, the neighbour is not only someone who stands before the self, face to face, but each and every other or the numerous others, is a neighbour or the other. “The third” thus evokes responsibility for everything and everyone.<sup>50</sup> The appearance of the third person obliges the self to respond to more than particular Other. However, it must decide whom to respond to first. This decision leads to the ego from the an-archial, ethical relation to the realm of political relation.<sup>51</sup>

The political relation, according to Levinas, is directed towards a responsibility that reaches, where everyone is responsible for everyone.<sup>52</sup> The world of institutions and impersonal justice must be held in check by the an-archial responsibility for the other. Levinas call for both anarchical and justice is mandatory to create ethical society.<sup>53</sup> Responsibility for the third person is fundamental to maintain universal sociality.

We are responsible not only for the people around us whom we know and are close to. It is an obligation towards ‘the third man’ or every human being; in the language of Levinas it is to “*the third party*,” even topographical inaccessibility cannot confine it. A nation, state, province, tribe, clan, village, etc. is responsible for another one though unknown and have no face to face encounter. It has responsibility not to perpetrate the sovereignty, autonomy, and freedom; dignity and rights of peoples of other nation; because “the closeness of proximity is never close enough to subsume ‘the Other’ in the self and vice-versa.”<sup>54</sup> Proximity in contact is neither to invest the other nor annul his alterity, nor to suppress the self in the others.<sup>55</sup> The self, exactly as responsible for the other and the third, remain indifferent to their interactions. One must perceive the individuals of a *genus* behind the unique singularity.<sup>56</sup> Responsibility for the third party is responsibility for the whole humanity; because true sociality is exposed to all Others, the individual confronts all others, it doesn’t remain amongst two parties.

### Conclusion

Ethical responsibility is a responsibility not only for the self but for all around us. Every person is responsible for his neighbouring ‘other’ who is predominantly a stranger: defenceless, unprotected, whose very existence is threatened and corresponds to the various conundrums associated to human beings. Ethical responsibility encompasses face to face empathy, putting oneself in other person’s situation out of genuine ethical love; and it summons us to establish ethical justice and freedom in the society. Ethical responsibility demands all these through ethical relation in order to ensure that unconditional and irrevocable humanity is highly valued and respected above any material dynamics. Conversely, ethical relations in correspondence with ethical responsibility transcend from the particular other to “the third party.” We live not only with the person neighbouring to us but also in society with a multitude, and the encounter with the multitude is called a political relation or universal sociality.

<sup>47</sup>Levinas, *Ethics and Infinity, Conversations with Philippe Nemo*, 101.

<sup>48</sup>Sean, *The Levinas Reader*, 107.

<sup>49</sup>Treanor, *Aspects of Alterity: Levinas, Marcel and Contemporary Debate*, 32.

<sup>50</sup>Klinger Scoralick, “The Other, the Third and Justice,” In *Ethics and Politics*, 23(1) 2021, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, 305.

<sup>51</sup>William Simmons, “Philosophy and Social Criticism,” 26(6) 1999, 83

<sup>52</sup>Klinger Scoralick, “The Other, the Third and Justice,” 319.

<sup>53</sup>William Simmons, “Philosophy and Social Criticism,” 83.

<sup>54</sup>Ramona Rat, “Uncommon Sociality: Thinking Sociality with Levinas,” *Soderton Philosophical Studies*, 98.

<sup>55</sup>Levinas, *Otherwise than Being, Or Beyond Essence*, 86.

<sup>56</sup>Levinas, *Entre Nous: Thinking –of– the Other*, 230.

**Bibliography**

1. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, (ed.). *The Self and the Other: The Irreducible Other, Irreducible Element in Man, Part 1, the Crisis of Man*. Holland: Springer Science +Business Media Dordrecht, 1977.
2. Burggraave, Roger. "Violence and the Vulnerable Face of the other." *In Journal of Social Philosophy* 30, no. 1 (Spring 1999): 29-45.
3. Edelglas, William. "Levinas on Suffering and Compassion." *Sophia* (Ashgate Publishing Limited) 2, no. 45 (October 2006): 43-59.
4. Gary Ray, Sunshine. "Hope as a Strategy: Messianism in the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas." *Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 1625*, 2019.
5. Kearney, Richard. *States of Mind: Dialogues with Contemporary Thinkers*. New York: NYU Press, 1995.
6. Levinas, Emmanuel. *Ethics and Infinity, Conversations with Philippe Nemo*. Translated by Richard A. Cohen. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1982.
7. Levinas, Emmanuel. *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence*. Translated by Alphonso Lingis. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1988.
8. Levinas, Emmanuel. *Time and the Other*. Translated by Richard A. Cohen. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1987.
9. Levinas, Emmanuel. *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*. Translated by Alphonso Lingis. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969.
10. Levinas, Emmanuel. *Is It Righteous to Be? Interviews with Emmanuel Levinas*. Edited by Jill Robbins. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001.
11. Levinas, Emmanuel. "Philosophy, Justice and Love." *In Entre Nous: On Thinking-for-the-Other*. Translated by Michael B. Smith and Barbara Harshav, 103-121. New York: Columbia University Press, 1998.
12. Levinas, Emmanuel. "Useless Suffering." *In Entre Nous: Thinking-for-the-Other*. Translated by M. Smith and B. Harshav, 91-101. New York: Columbia University Press, 1998.
13. Paul A. Schilp and Maurice S. Friedman, (eds.). *The Philosophy of Martin Buber*. La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1967.
14. Perpich, Diane. *The Ethics of Emmanuel Levinas*, Edited by Mieke Bal and Hent de Vries, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008
15. Peperzak, Adriaan, (ed.). *Ethics as First Philosophy: The Significance of Emmanuel Levinas for Philosophy, Literature, and Religion*. New York: Routledge, 1995.
16. Rastaei, Hamed and Gharamaleki, Ahad Faramaz, "Substitution," *In Levinas and Replacement in Sympathy: Two Different Approaches to Facing the Other. Journal of Philosophical Theological Research* 4, no. 23(2021) Dio:10.22091/jptr.2021.7006.2549.
17. Rat, Ramona, "Uncommon Sociality: Thinking Sociality with Levinas," *Soderton Philosophical Studies*, 2016.
18. Schroeder, Brian and Silvia, Benso, *Levinas and the Ancients*, (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2008.
19. Scoralick, Klinger. *The Other, the Third and Justice*. Vol. 1, *In Ethics and Politics*, 305-321. Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, 2021.
20. Sean, Hand. (ed.), *The Levinas Readers*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989.
21. Shaw, Joshua James. *Emmanuel Levinas on the Priority of Ethics: Putting Ethics First*. New York: Cambria Press, 2008.
22. Simon Critchley and Robert Bernasconi, (ed.). *The Cambridge Companion to Levinas*. Spargo, Clifton R. *Vigilant Memory: Emmanuel Levinas, the Holocaust and the Unjust Death*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006.
23. Simmons, William. "Philosophy and Social Criticism." 6, no. 26 (1999): 83-104.
24. Tamasbel-Birgani, Victoria. *Emmanuel Levinas and the Politics of Non-Violence*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014.
25. Treanor, Brain. *Aspects of Alterity: Levinas, Marcel and Contemporary Debate*. New York: Fordham University Press, 2006.
26. Wambua, Luciano Mattei-P. *A Guide to Christian Ethics and Formation in Moral Maturity, Introduction to Ethics*. Nairobi: The Catholic University of Eastern Africa Press, 2000.
27. Wyschogrod, Edith. *Emmanuel Levinas: The Problem of Ethical metaphysics*. Vol. 1. Martinus Nijhoff: The Hague, 1974.