

EDITH STEIN'S EMPATHY A SUBSTRATUM FOR INTERSUBJECTIVITY

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IJASR 2022

VOLUME 5

ISSUE 2 MARCH – APRIL

ISSN: 2581-7876

Abstract: More ever than before the concept of empathy today remains a critical notion in the contemporary discourses, debates and conferences in psychology, philosophy of mind, social and moral philosophies. This article presents Edith Stein's conception of empathy, as a substratum for intersubjectivity, an intersubjectivity inclined towards the hermeneutics of social-communal ethics domain. A domain that encompasses mutual acceptance and respect for other people's living-bodies endowed with feelings, emotions and mental states. It is an intersubjectivity for interpersonal and reciprocal relationships of living subjects, developed through an empathetic connection of living human bodies, communication and the we-community. A community of communal love than hatred, respect and dignity for all people without any form of exploitation and manipulation.

Keywords: Empathy, Living-body (*leib-Korper*), Intentionality, Motivation, Intersubjectivity, Connection, Communication and Life We-Community.

Introduction

Since antiquity the Aristotelian-thomistic and Cartesian epistemology through abstraction method, endeavoured to establish how the subject (man) can know the outer objects of knowledge namely; God, man and the world. The existing relationship between man and his fellowmen was in the level of subject-object or subject to subject-object. To liberate man form this epistemological aporia of subject-object relationship and interaction to subject-subject relationship came through the phenomenological concept of the living physco-psychical body of man. A living body that is not just a mere material body among material objects to be subjected to laws of physics, empirical or positive sciences for verification, exploitation or manipulation, rather it is a body that sets empathy on motion and blends interpersonal relationship of mutual respect and co-existence of co-experiencing cooperating living subjects.

1.1 A Synopsis of Stein's Conception of Empathy

As a student and an assistant to Husserl, Edith Stein developed her doctoral thesis theme *On the Problem of Empathy* from Husserl's lectures on *Nature and Spirit*¹. Being under Husserl's supervision, thus a faithful follower of Husserlian phenomenological method of transcendental reduction, Stein conception of the empathy seems to confluence both Husserl's *Ideas I* and *Ideas II*, particularly on the notion of the living-body or *Leib-korper*². For Stein therefore, empathy is an intentional and motivational *sui-generis* act, which occurs here and now, there and then without any detour of living human bodies that are available and present to each other³.

The action that empathy occurs between two living human bodies here and now, makes empathy both a primordial and a non-primordial act⁴. To an empathizer, empathy is primordial because an empathizer experiences an empathee in front of him and is non-primordial because the empathizer is not the original bearer of those empathetic lived experiences. Similarly, for an empathee, empathy is primordial because he is the original bearer of the empathetic content, but also non-primordial because the lived-living experience from an empathee to the empathizer is givenness non-primordially. Furthermore, Stein developed and demonstrated her empathetic account

¹Edith Stein, *On the Problem of Empathy*, trans .Waltraut Stein (Dordrecht: Springer-Science+Business Media, B.V. 1964), V, *Z-library*. Henceforth, Stein, *On the Problem of Empathy*.

²Stein, *On the Problem of Empathy*, VII.

³Stein, *On the Problem of Empathy*, XIII, XIV, XVII, 7, 11, 50, 78.

⁴Stein, *On the Problem of Empathy*, 7-8.

basing on three steps or modalities namely; emergence of experience that we can call primary empathy, explicational fulfilment that we can call extended empathy and lastly comprehensional objectification of empathetic experience that we can call reiterate-empathy or reflexive sympathy⁵.

Empathy thus for Stein, is a feeling developed on the account of otherness feeling, cognised on three subsequent modalities, intertwined into two forms of empathy; sensual and emotional empathies. Both sensual and emotional empathy bear various level of feelings or affectivities from the least to the highest, namely sensory feelings, common or general feelings, moods, emotions and sentiments⁶. The point to note is that the five affectivities are perceptual and imaginative for an empathizer but are expressed by the empee's body⁷.

1.2 Phenomenology of Empathetic; Intentionality, Motivation and Meaning

Empathy has its intentionality with its directedness, it has meaning with its whatness and howness of its givenness based on motivation⁸. Being vital phenomenological concepts, intentionality without motivation, is like willing to act or choose but keeping aloof from acting or choosing. It is for this reasons, empathy is a directed act motivated by the empathizing content of feelings, emotions and mental state of the alien consciousness living body⁹. Empathy thus, as a unique intentional act, precipitates the understanding of other person as a subject with feelings and emotional experiences to be cared¹⁰.

1.2.1 Empathetic Intentionality

Edith Stein's empathetic intentional act follows Husserlian pedagogy of the *noema* and the *noesis*, but also Brentanian model of intentional feelings and emotions¹¹. For Stein, emotions are intentional phenomenons directed towards the other person and discloses what is valuable to us¹². Like Husserl, Stein postulates; consciousness is always active and directed towards something, this active intentionality makes a subject willing to; perceive, know and evaluate the object of intention¹³. The intentional object in our present state of affairs is the other subject that enables the constitution of an empathetic intentionality, where the givenness of the experience of the foreign consciousness is through empathy¹⁴.

As a directed intentional act towards the alien *leib-körper* of a human person, empathy remains a distinctive intentional act, directed towards fellow-feeling lived experiences in the spirit of feeling-with, in which the 'you' and 'I' feelings, yields a 'we' feeling of subjects with the empathizing content¹⁵. Therefore, with empathetic Intentionality, we appreciate the validity and meaningfulness of our subjective achievements and contribution for other people's lives in the life-world¹⁶.

⁵Stein, *On the Problem of Empathy*, XIV, 11.

⁶Edith Stein, *The Collected Works of Edith Stein Volume Three: On the Problem of Empathy Third Edition*, trans. Waltraut Stein (Washington, D.C: ICS Publications, 1989), 18-20, 33-34, 100-04, *Z-library*. Henceforth, Stein, *The Collected Works of Edith Stein*.

⁷Stein, *On the Problem of Empathy*, 18-19.

⁸Stein, *On the Problem of Empathy*, XII, 58, 88.

⁹Cardinal Karol Wojtyla, *The Acting Person*, trans. Andrzej Potocki (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1979), 128-130. *Z-library*. Henceforth, Wojtyla, *The Acting Person*.

¹⁰Antonio Calcagno, *Edith Stein: Women, Social- Political Philosophy, Theology, Metaphysics and Public History: New Approaches and Applications* (New York Dordrecht London: Springer International Publishing Switzerland, 2016), 52-53, *Z-library*. Henceforth, Calcagno, *Edith Stein*.

¹¹Elisa Magri & Dermot Moran, *Empathy, Sociality, and Personhood Essays on Edith Stein's Phenomenological Investigations* (Cham, Switzerland: Springer International Publishing AG, 2017), 22, 66-67, 71, 76, *Z-library*. Henceforth, Magri & Moran, *Empathy, Sociality, and Personhood*.

¹²Magri & Moran, *Empathy, Sociality, and Personhood*, 66-67, 75.

¹³Stein, *The Collected Worksof Edith Stein*, XVII.

¹⁴Stein, *On the Problem of Empathy*, 87.

¹⁵Stein, *The Collected Worksof Edith Stein*, 16-18.

¹⁶Dan Zahavi, *Phenomenology the Basics* (London & New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2019), 27, 37-38, *Z-library*. Henceforth, Zahavi, *Phenomenology the Basics*.

As a phenomenological insight, empathetic intentionality is conscious and conscious is always intentional in doing and pointing towards something. Here our empathetic intentionality is an action that points to intersubjectivity whose subject is the other living body with empathetic experiential content. Empathy thus, is a phenomenon of consciousness and this consciousness is intersubjective in character. Therefore, since consciousness is always conscious of something, intentionality of the lived experiences of the living body, are to be transformed into a meaningful value-horizon of the manifold of intersubjective experiences¹⁷.

Phenomenologically, people relate through intentional conscious acts. Empathetic intentionality therefore, therapeutically brings the alien consciousness world into the empathizer's consciousness, a consciousness that is always intentional. Conscious act however, becomes intentional when an empathizer can inspect the givenness of the other's phenomenal acts and qualities of sensual and emotional empathy. As Stein notes, empathy is a unique intentional act of consciousness that deals with the givenness of foreign experiences, it is through this givenness that we comprehend otherness experiences¹⁸. We thus, access and apprehend other subjects' feelings, emotions and mental state because empathy is a *sui generis* intentional act of experiencing other embodied subject given to us experientially¹⁹. Empathetic intentionality hence, is not analogical or an imitational, for such acts limits the knowing and understanding of other peoples' feelings and emotions²⁰.

Similarly, empathetic intentionality is an antidote to Descartes epistemological relational crisis of un-extended thinking thing, the mind and the extended unthinking thing, the body²¹. For Stein, although the mind or the soul is pure I and the body is the empirical or physical I, both are embedded within the living body with sensations, which for Descartes were source of deception, but for Stein, sensations belong to the pure I, a constituent of consciousness that the *cogito* cannot even doubt and bracket them, because the living body is always at the point of zero orientation²². Therefore, when sensation participate in the physical I, the physical I becomes not just a physical object, *Körper* but a living sensual body, *Leib-körper* as an expressive phenomena that blends a natural fraternal unity of bodily intentionality between an empathee and an empathizer.

Stein believed that the content of empathizing experience is indirectly given to the empathizer, this indirectness makes empathy both non-primordial and primordial act, but primordially being announced in the non-primordially²³. The non-primordially and primordially dimensions of empathy makes Husserlian notion of *leib-körper* to play a critical role in enumerating Stein's bodily givenness presence of the alien subject²⁴. Sensual empathy is based on direct and immediate perception of the living bodily presence that contains the content of empathizing experiences, therefore, with sensual empathy we interpret our physical body as living body and living body as physical body²⁵. The living body sets empathy in motion²⁶, for it constitute the basis of the emergence of all feelings of perception and intentional reciprocity of experiences that attunes the platform of experiencing, understanding, communicating and working in togetherness or in solidarity²⁷.

Empathy is thus, a relational and an intentional experience of living-body subjects²⁸. This living-body *leib-körper*, mediates the intersubjective interaction upon which living experiences underlines the flow of consciousness as

¹⁷Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, trans. Donald A. Landes (Abingdon: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2012), 54, 429, 478, Z-library. Henceforth, Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*.

¹⁸Stein, *The Collected Worksof Edith Stein*, 59, 70, 82, 89.

¹⁹Stein, *The Collected Worksof Edith Stein*, XVIII, 6, 19, 82.

²⁰Dan Zahavi, *Self and Other: Exploring Subjectivity, Empathy, and Shame* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2014), 104, 110-115, 168, Z-library. Henceforth, Zahavi, *Self and Other*.

²¹Stein, *The Collected Worksof Edith Stein*, XX.

²²Stein, *The Collected Worksof Edith Stein*, XIX-XXI

²³Stein, *The Collected Worksof Edith Stein*, 17, 54.

²⁴Stein, *On the Problem of Empathy*, VII, XVI-XVII, XX, 38-40, 44.

²⁵Stein, *The Collected Worksof Edith Stein*, 58-60.

²⁶Stein, *The Collected Worksof Edith Stein*, 75-76.

²⁷Edith Stein, *Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities*, ed. Marianne Sawicki and trans. Mary Catharine Baseheart and Marianne Sawicki (Washington D.C: ICS Publications Institute of Carmelite Studies, 2000), 112-14, 222, 229, 236, 243-44, Z-library. Henceforth, Stein, *Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities*.

²⁸Albert K. Bach, *Empathy: Past, Present and Future Perspectives* (New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 2019), 6, Z-library. Henceforth, Bach, *Empathy: Past, Present and Future Perspectives*

opposed to the physical-body *korper*²⁹. As Schutz argues that, the interaction between consciousnesses within space and time and the living body blends a natural empirical unity, in which the intentional empathetic act of consciousness makes understanding between subjects a possible reciprocal phenomenon because both subjects exist in a one we-world of experiences³⁰.

1.2.2 Empathetic Motivation

Stein's empathetic experiences is always from the perspective of the other and self, in which both the alien and the self relate through a motivational empathetic intentional act of sensory and emotional connectivity, creating a sphere of intersubjective experience of unique living individual subjects³¹. Empathy consciously brings two horizons of consciousness into play, where there is a reciprocal perception of the other subjects as oneself. Empathetic motivation hence, is not causal act but a critical element in the intentional constitution of the foreign living-body. As Okello argues, intentionality is understood in term of motivation that makes the unperceived lived experience carried along with the perceived experiences become perceivable³². For Stein motivation is a "propellant power³³" a law of the spirit belonging to both the living individual and the life community³⁴. Stein re-echoes Alexander Pfander and argues that motivation is the way of accounting the logic and the narrative coherence of human action³⁵. However, she defines motivation, as "a symbolic, experienced proceeding of one experiences from another without a detour over the object sphere"³⁶. Motivation thus, is the lawfulness of mental-life to distinguish rational lawfulness from essential lawfulness, whereby to will is not a causality but a feeling that is essentially motivated, thus impossible to have unmotivated willingness³⁷. Therefore, empathy is not only an epistemological tool to know the feelings and mental states of others but also a motivational impetus that seeks to promote the well-being and perceive the desired good in and for other living human bodies³⁸.

Since empathy is an intentional act than analogical inference or imitation, it arises a motivational awareness that is directed towards knowing, understanding and caring of the feelings, emotional values, attitude and mental state of an empathizer³⁹. The above understanding and caring is based on historical and cultural worldview of an empathizer⁴⁰. Therefore, for Stein, empathy enables us to access other people's motivation⁴¹. This motivation, proceeds from empathizer's experience to that of empathizee's without a detour, so as to grasp the givenness of the foreign experiences⁴², though as Husserl annotates, this givenness is open to infinite horizons that at times remains undiscovered⁴³. Therefore, through empathetic motivation an empathizer systematically accomplishes the three empathetic modalities, namely; emergence, fulfilment and comprehension of empathizee's experiences through perception and imagination, in which any perceptual blushing has to be necessarily motivated by shame or guilt⁴⁴.

²⁹Manganaro, *The Roots of Intersubjectivity – Empathy and Phenomenology*, 273, 276.

³⁰Alfred Schutz, *The Phenomenology of the Social World*, trans. George Walsh and Frederick Lehnert (Vienna: Northwestern University Press, 1967), 100, 162-63, 170-71, *Z-library*. Henceforth, Schutz, *The Phenomenology of the Social World*.

³¹Stein, *The Collected Works of Edith Stein*, 44, 49, 53, 83-84.

³²Stephen Okello IMC, *Intersubjective Communication in the Phenomenology of Husserl* (Roma: Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, 2001), 75-76. Henceforth, Okello, *Intersubjective Communication*.

³³Calcagno, *Edith Stein*, 30.

³⁴Cf. Calcagno, *Edith Stein*, 57-58.

³⁵Stein, *Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities*, 12.

³⁶Stein, *On the Problem of Empathy*, XVII, 78.

³⁷Stein, *On the Problem of Empathy*, 88.

³⁸Diana Sofronieva, "The Epistemic and Moral Value of Empathy" (PhD diss., The University of Leeds School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science, 2018), 190-192, 194, *Z-library*. Henceforth, Sofronieva, "The Epistemic and Moral Value of Empathy".

³⁹Alasdair MacIntyre, *Edith Stein; A Philosophical Prologue 1913-1922* (Lanham, Maryland: The Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2006), 86. Henceforth, MacIntyre, *Edith Stein; A Philosophical Prologue*.

⁴⁰Cf. Magri & Moran, *Empathy, Sociality, and Personhood*, 95-96.

⁴¹Stein, *Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities*, 365.

⁴²Stein, *On the Problem of Empathy*, XVII, 23, 78.

⁴³Edmund Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*, trans. Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1960), 101, *Z-library*. Henceforth, Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*.

⁴⁴Stein, *On the Problem of Empathy*, XIV, 71, 78-79.

1.2.3 Empathetic Meaning

Just as Husserl had argued in his *Logical Investigation* that, what is meant and expressed in the meaning, is truth that becomes the object of intention⁴⁵. The meaningfulness of something, asserts Schutz, is obtained when attentional focus is given to it, for meaning of a thing is animated by the intentional act of consciousness⁴⁶. We have elucidated that empathy is an intentional and a motivational act towards the feelings, emotions and mental state of an empath. However, it is absurd, if empathy as an intentional and a motivational act lacks meaning. Stein asserts that, the unity of meaning between what is expressed and how of what is expressed blends an empathetic harmony⁴⁷. This meaning is always in general and requires the imaginative grounds of the meaningful experiences between what is experienced and how it is expressed, so that what is experienced is expressed in the expression of the fulfilled experiences⁴⁸.

Being Husserl's faithful disciple, Stein re-introduces us to Husserl's phenomenological concept of *gehalt* or the meaning of the primordial and non-primordial content of experience⁴⁹, however, empathy is a primordial experience with non-primordial content⁵⁰. Additionally, what is paramount in analysis of the empathetic content is the *what* or "*gegenstand*"⁵¹, and the *how* or "*gegebenheit*"⁵², of the givenness of the empathetic content. The *what* of the content, is the object of experience of sensual empathy and the *how* is the way the object of experience is given. The difference between the *what* and the *how* of the empathetic content, lies in the egoish which is an activity of life power⁵³. Crucial to note is the *what* of what is given is always in correlation with the *way* of the *how* of *what* is given.

Therefore, by meaning we mean the content of the empathetic experiential feelings in which, with the emergence of experience, the empathetic perception of external features like, body posture and gestures of an empath argues Stein, gives some basic meanings of his personality and what he is experiencing⁵⁴. In addition, the content of feelings and emotions reflect the hierarchy of values, for this reason every feeling and emotion has a value because when feelings develop into emotions, our bodies not only becomes a medium of feeling but also a ground of judging the *what* and the *how* of the given empathetic content⁵⁵. Therefore, empathetic meaning is obtained from lived-living experiences that necessitates the relation between subjects with their world. For philosopher like Dilthey, lived experience communicate life, thus understanding them entails re-experiencing the experiences of the subjects both the past and the future in the present⁵⁶. As Stein says, empathy occurs "here and now"⁵⁷, through the point of zero orientation, where one finds oneself as a living subject among subjects with feelings and emotions⁵⁸. This point of zero orientation makes one construct comprehensive dialogue and acceptable valid arguments about the shared world. The meanings of things in this shared world has to transcend our individual scopes and refer to the wider interactive reality in which all other subjects participate. This phenomenon of sharing makes intersubjectivity a focal point of meaning-making and a point of agreed social construction of choices about values.

2.1 Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity

Stein came across the term intersubjectivity while editing Husserl's *ideas II*, however, Johannes Volkelt who Stein also analyses his theories of fusion and association as empathy⁵⁹, had already introduced intersubjectivity in the

⁴⁵Edmund Husserl, *The Shorter Logical Investigations*, trans. J. N. Findlay (London and New York: Taylor & Francis, 2002), 65, 94, 114-17, 133, 189, *Z-library*. Henceforth, Husserl, *The Shorter Logical Investigations*.

⁴⁶Schutz, *The Phenomenology of the Social World*, 34-35.

⁴⁷Stein, *On the Problem of Empathy*, 79.

⁴⁸Stein, *On the Problem of Empathy*, 75-76.

⁴⁹Cf. Magrì & Moran, *Empathy, Sociality, and Personhood*, 37-39, 97, 129-30, 164.

⁵⁰Magrì & Moran, *Empathy, Sociality, and Personhood*, 129.

⁵¹Magrì & Moran, *Empathy, Sociality, and Personhood*, 198.

⁵²Magrì & Moran, *Empathy, Sociality, and Personhood*, 15, 37.

⁵³Cf. Stein, *Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities*, 41-43, 102, 106.

⁵⁴Stein, *On the Problem of Empathy*, 72.

⁵⁵Stein, *The Collected Works of Edith Stein*, XXII, 5, 82, 101, 108.

⁵⁶Cf. Stein, *On the Problem of Empathy*, XVIII-XIX, 12-13, 8-9, 67-68, 101, 103.

⁵⁷Stein, *On the Problem of Empathy*, 7.

⁵⁸Stein, *On the Problem of Empathy*, 57-58.

⁵⁹Stein, *On the Problem of Empathy*, 25, 55-56.

German spirit by 1885 and James Ward in England in 1896⁶⁰. For Husserl intersubjectivity came earlier than empathy, for Stein empathy came earlier than intersubjectivity. Husserl had introduced the concept of intersubjectivity in his *Ideas I* as a warranty of gaining objective knowledge of the outer world, human beings included thus, very naturalistic in character⁶¹. However, he developed later a personalistic intersubjectivity than a naturalistic in his *Ideas II*, where intersubjectivity was a mutual exchange of experiences between living bodies of human persons, this mutuality was facilitated by empathy found in his fifth meditation of the *Cartesian Meditation*, Husserl also explicated intersubjectivity in his work *Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental phenomenology*, where he introduced the idea of the lifeworld⁶². Natural attitude thus, as opposed to naturalistic attitude is an approach to physico-physical living subject not objects⁶³. Therefore, etymologically intersubjectivity is the study of relation between subjects⁶⁴, and not a relation between subject-object, or subject to subject-object.

Furthermore, as Schutz argues in his work *Phenomenology of the Social World*, Husserl's concept of intersubjectivity has a broader range of meanings of phenomena to be grasped, meaning it is genetical, and not only for objectivity of knowledge⁶⁵. Schutz replaces Husserl's mutual understanding of the natural attitude with we-relationship, a relationship that promotes participation in the shared world, understanding of others through interactions and being conscious of them⁶⁶. In the we-relationship asserts Schutz, there is a mutual engagement in grasping each other as living subjects with streams of consciousness of lived experiences, in which subjects grow together by knowing their close and direct experiences⁶⁷. This is why for Husserl, the comprehensive unity of consciousness and the body-subject cements the departure point of a shared cognitive and social world of intersubjective living experiences⁶⁸. Stein's empathetic experiences hence, is always from the perspective of the other and self, in which both the alien and the self relate through a motivational empathetic intentional act of sensory and emotional connectivity, creating a sphere of intersubjective experience of unique living individual subjects⁶⁹. When empathy substrates intersubjectivity, an empathetic intersubjectivity is constituted, as a phenomenon in which mutuality between subjects results to insightful interpretation of interpersonal lived experiences for mutual relationship and understanding⁷⁰.

3.1 Why Empathy Substrates Intersubjectivity

As history demonstrates, empathy was an epistemic root in grasping the alien conscious mind, but later become also the basis of social ontology and moral-ethics philosophy in which one considers himself as one among many other individuals⁷¹. For Stein empathy is both a primordial act that happens here and now, but also it is a non-primordial act due to the foreign content, hence empathy is not only a plane to understanding one's essence but also the nature of others⁷².

Empathy is itself an intersubjective act, as Stein argues, with empathy one realizes that he is a living individual subject among many other subject individuals⁷³. Empathy is an intentional act of how we experience alien subject feelings and emotions, it is the basic condition of intersubjective experience and possible knowledge of the outer

⁶⁰Zahavi, *Self and Other*, 97.

⁶¹Lester Embree and Thomas Nenon, *Husserl's Ideen* (New York & London: Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht, 2013), 36, 41, 313, *Z-library*. Henceforth, Embree and Nenon, *Husserl's Ideen*.

⁶²Cf. Embree and Nenon, *Husserl's Ideen*, 27-28, 37-41.

⁶³Embree and Nenon, *Husserl's Ideen*, 166-18, 130-32.

⁶⁴Zahavi, *Phenomenology the Basics*, 145.

⁶⁵Schutz, *The Phenomenology of the Social World*, 34-35, 159.

⁶⁶Cf. Schutz, *The Phenomenology of the Social World*, 115, 134, 157, 159, 165-68, 171-72.

⁶⁷Schutz, *The Phenomenology of the Social World*, 180, 183, 194, 219.

⁶⁸Cf. Embree and Nenon, *Husserl's Ideen*, 57-58, 118, 130, 289, 315.

⁶⁹Stein, *The Collected Worksof Edith Stein*, 44, 49, 53, 83-84.

⁷⁰Rita Wengorovius Ferro Meneses, "Experiences of Empathy" (PhD diss., University of Birmingham School of Psychology College of Life and Environmental Sciences, 2011), 179-80, 182, 247, *Z-library*. Henceforth, Meneses, "Experiences of Empathy".

⁷¹Stein, *On the Problem of Empathy*, 3, 49, 60, 82.

⁷²Stein, *On The Problem of Empathy*, XVIII.

⁷³Stein, *The Collected Worksof Edith Stein*, 64.

world⁷⁴. Stein's empathetic account was not only engineered towards the re-enactment of uncovering structures of empathetic experiences but fundamentally also, how empathy can facilitate mutual co-existence of people in the social-communal context and establish aesthetics of moral ethos, through their living bodies that makes empathy a relational and an intentional experience of living-body subject⁷⁵.

4.1 Three Substrates of Empathetic Intersubjectivity

These substrates includes empathetic; connection, communication and community whereby the living bodies are the vehicle of connecting and communicating with the alien subject in the constituted empathetic community.

4.1.1 Empathetic Intersubjective Connection

Connection discloses the phenomenon of unity in the streams of consciousness just like individual unity results from the body and the soul, creating a psychophysical unity of an individual⁷⁶. Empathetic connection hence, results from connection of multiple psychophysical individual unities, which constitute an empathetic intersubjective experience of streams of consciousness⁷⁷. In an empathetic connection, the bodily experienced feelings and emotions, and how they are expressed from the alien subject should have connection to avoid empathetic deceptions⁷⁸.

Intersubjectivity itself is a phenomenon of interconnection of subjects with living bodies anchored in the world. For Stein the empathetic connection emerges with the perception of the given bodily experiences of the other, making phenomenology a science of essential connection of lived experiences of living bodies⁷⁹. The living body is thus, a medium upon which empathetic connectivity sprouts, permeating the contact between self and the other physical and spiritual realities, thus interacting and cooperating in constituting a meaningful community of super-individuals⁸⁰. A community that we are always with-others, with our bodies presented as phenomenological realities than thinking subjects of the Cartesian aporia. Stein believed that, to have a complete empathetic experience, there must be a connection between sensory and emotional feelings, general feelings with mental or spiritual feelings, just as sluggishness may reveal the tiredness of the body, or hunger due to starvation⁸¹. Therefore, Stein submits that, sensations, which are beyond Cartesian doubt, completes the connection between general feelings and mental feelings⁸².

Furthermore, since Consciousness is always an intentional act that is directed towards something given⁸³. This intentional act is the one that connects the within consciousness of an empathizer to that of the without consciousness of an empathee, producing a we-consciousness in the world⁸⁴. Consciousnesses that are always open to each other, and in freedom constitute the collective socially-communal and spiritual realities of life⁸⁵. This connectivity however, is not solipsistic⁸⁶, or an analogically inferential feeling or knowing, but a fusion of consciousnesses participation⁸⁷. As Husserl postulates:

⁷⁴Amy Coplan and Peter Goldie, *Empathy: Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives* (New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 2011), XIII, *Z-library*. Henceforth, Coplan and Goldie, *Empathy*. See also, Calcagno, *Edith Stein*, 52.

⁷⁵Bach, *Empathy: Past, Present and Future Perspectives*, 6.

⁷⁶Stein, *The Collected Works of Edith Stein*, 39-40.

⁷⁷Stein, *The Collected Works of Edith Stein*, 38-39.

⁷⁸Stein, *On the Problem of Empathy*, 50, 75.

⁷⁹Stein, *On the Problem of Empathy*, 11, 58.

⁸⁰Stein, *Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities*, 18, 193, 336.

⁸¹Stein, *The Collected Works of Edith Stein*, 49, 68-69.

⁸²Stein, *On the Problem of Empathy*, XIV, 41.

⁸³Francesco Alfieri, *The Presence of Duns Scotus in the Thought of Edith Stein: the Question of Individuality*, trans. George Metcalf (Springer International Publishing Switzerland, 2015), 121, *Z-library*. Henceforth, Alfieri, *The Presence of Duns Scotus in the Thought of Edith Stein*.

⁸⁴Alfieri, *The Presence of Duns Scotus in the Thought of Edith Stein*, 76, 80.

⁸⁵Alfieri, *The Presence of Duns Scotus in the Thought of Edith Stein*, 80.

⁸⁶Alfieri, *The Presence of Duns Scotus in the Thought of Edith Stein*, 80.

⁸⁷Cf. Stein, *The Collected Works of Edith Stein*, 12, 27, 64, 87.

In the solipsistic question of self-experiencing, I encounter all my subjectivity through my living body as a reality. However, it is only through empathy that my psychic life is apprehended with other bodies, bodies that constitute the unity of man, a unity I later transfer to myself⁸⁸.

The above Husserlian arguments, depicts that empathy constitute the reality of man, a reality that is intersubjective in character, through the living human bodies that sets empathy as an intentional act in motion⁸⁹. The anthropology of living body thus, marks the first departure point of empathetic connectivity, so that communication can be enhanced, thus a communal sphere subject constituted.

Furthermore, Stein's empathetic connection arises also from the second mode of empathetic experience, the "fulfilling of explication"⁹⁰. In this mode, the living body bearing living experiences grounds the completeness of intersubjectivity that safeguards the flow of consciousness in which, the alter ego shapes my own identity⁹¹. Through a transcendental reduction, one is drawn to a point of zero orientation, to co-originally experience what the other is experiencing, so that this point of orientation makes an empathetic connection a mutual "co-experiencing"⁹² act, or a mutual "corporation"⁹³ act.

Empathy therefore, blends sensual and emotional connection between living subjects, and when subjects empathetically connect, they know the interest, mental states, the good and wrongdoings of each other⁹⁴. Subjects develop communal concern through ethics of care, enacting a ground for sharing and communicating their feelings that goes beyond mere outer perceptions of idle talks⁹⁵. As Ortega articulates in his work *The Origin of Philosophy*; connection is a dialectical enterprise of mutual encounter and identification of feelings and thoughts, when we mutually connect in our manner of speaking, connection becomes a human condition of establishing communication⁹⁶.

4.1.2 Empathetic Intersubjective Communication

Empathy is itself a communicative act that entails listening, talking and acting together in the world⁹⁷. Håkansson asserts by quoting Schopenhauer that, theoretical knowledge is not enough in becoming a good person; "virtue does indeed result from knowledge, but not from obstruct knowledge communicable through words"⁹⁸. Our sentimental feelings therefore, towards the alien subjects are expressed through fundamental anatomies and attitudes of communicative actions namely; facial expressions, gestures and posture⁹⁹. Thus, in an empathetic communication, we dialogue, constituting a web of we-communication, in which the sublime unity of interpersonal communal experiences is attained¹⁰⁰.

Additionally, Okello postulates that, in any given social domain, communication and language are basic determinants of interpersonal and social relations, hence creating a community not of idle talks but of a communion discourse of subjects¹⁰¹. Through communication, there is a transection of knowledge through silence, listening and

⁸⁸Edmund Husserl, *Phenomenological Investigations on Constitution: Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, Vol II*, trans. R. Rojcewicz & A. Schuwer (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publisher, 1913/1989), 175, *Z-library*. Henceforth, Husserl, *Phenomenological Investigations on Constitution*.

⁸⁹Stein, *On the Problem of Empathy*, 18, 63, 66, 95.

⁹⁰Stein, *The Collected Worksof Edith Stein*, XVIII, 10.

⁹¹Manganaro, "The Roots of Intersubjectivity – Empathy and Phenomenology" 162-64, 276.

⁹²Stein, *On the Problem of Empathy*, 17, 60.

⁹³Stein, *Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities*, 374.

⁹⁴Cf. Coplan and Goldie, *Empathy*, 108, 188, 222, 328.

⁹⁵Coplan and P. Goldie, *Empathy*, 63.

⁹⁶Jose Ortega y Gasset, *The Origin of Philosophy*, trans. Toby Talbot (New York: WW. Norton & Company. Inc., 1967), 16-17, *Z-library*. Henceforth, Gasset, *The Origin of Philosophy*.

⁹⁷Magrî & Moran, *Empathy, Sociality, and Personhood*, 163.

⁹⁸Jakob Håkansson, "Exploring the Phenomenon of Empathy" (PhD diss., Stockholm University Department of Psychology, 2003), 26, *Z-library*. Henceforth, Håkansson, "Exploring the Phenomenon of Empathy".

⁹⁹Magrî & Moran, *Empathy, Sociality, and Personhood*, 188.

¹⁰⁰Zahavi, *Phenomenology the Basics*, 99-100.

¹⁰¹Stephen Okello, "Existence as Being with Others," (Unpublished manuscript), 5-11, printed-script. Henceforth, Okello, "Existence as Being with Others."

responding, giving and receiving knowledge from each other, thus creating an interpersonal sphere of mutual dialogue and understanding¹⁰².

In our contemporary world, dialogue and communication are focal aspect in encountering the other in the intersubjective matrix. Zahavi aligning with Scheler's spiritual faculty acclaims; just as Scheler asserted that the spiritual domain of a person, which is his essence, can only be grasped through communication, the cognitive acts of an empathizer therefore, can remain hidden until an empathizer decide to communicate them¹⁰³. Empathy hence, is a communicative transection between subjects that confront each other face to face to make empathetic communication a meaningful adventure of exchange of feelings and emotions¹⁰⁴.

Heidegger also alluded that in communication we discourse by asserting and sharing our significant assertions by speaking and pointing out what we see, thus developing a language of expressing our experiences of life¹⁰⁵. For this reason empathetic communication becomes a purposeful enterprise that unveils itself in a multi-layered way, but primarily verbal, as Jasper says, the world is by nature verbal, but also the non-verbal layers of language, that enables an empathizer to grasp and understand empathizer's psychological or technical meaning of; his gesture, voice intonation and facial expression is also significant¹⁰⁶.

In communication, language is a medium upon which reciprocity between subjects is achieved, as Heidegger alluded language is "a house of being"¹⁰⁷. For Habermas, the roots and the starting point of intersubjectivity is language¹⁰⁸, and it is only through philosophy of language that intersubjectivity is attained and in intersubjectivity communication established¹⁰⁹. Once language is in play, communication takes place in a structure of being-with-others in the world, that permeates understanding between subjects of intending consciousness through a conversation that cements what Merleau-Ponty calls, 'a linguistical field'¹¹⁰, in which communication as Jaspers argued, discloses truth in time¹¹¹. Therefore, when two subjects empathetically engages each, their engagement transforms empathy into a communicative act of intersubjectivity, hence forming a community of subject with communal-life¹¹², whereby, an empathizer grasps the viewpoints of an empathizer, there and then¹¹³.

Empathetic communication therefore, is the genesis of knowing and sharing views with other people in the communal transection of feelings and emotions. Whereby, we come to know and understand other people's griefs, joy, temperaments, likings and dislikes through the language they communicate them¹¹⁴. Empathetic communication is a therapy as Smith acclaims:

¹⁰²Okello, "Existence as Being with Others," 5-11.

¹⁰³Max Scheler, *The Nature of Sympathy* (London and New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2017), 31, *Z-library*. Henceforth, Scheler, *The Nature of Sympathy*, 102, 225. See also, Zahavi, *Self and Other*, 120.

¹⁰⁴Zahavi, *Self and Other*, 194.

¹⁰⁵Cf. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 1962), 197, 199, 203, 205-06, 317, *Z-library*. Henceforth, Heidegger, *Being and Time*.

¹⁰⁶Cf. *Karl Jaspers' Philosophy and Psychopathology*, ed. Thomas Fuchs, Thiemo Breyer & Christoph Mundt (New York: Springer Science+Business Media, 2014), 22-23, 30, 154, 166, 182, *Z-library*.

¹⁰⁷Martin Heidegger, *The Question Concerning Technology: and other Essay*, trans. William Lovitt (New York & London: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1977), XX, *Z-library*. Henceforth, Heidegger, *The Question Concerning Technology*.

¹⁰⁸Andrew Edgar, *The Philosophy of Habermas* (Montreal & Kingston • Ithaca: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2005), 85-86, 165. Henceforth, Edgar, *The Philosophy of Habermas*.

¹⁰⁹Cf. Jurgen Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action Vol II Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason*, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1987), 10-11, 93, 259-60, *Z-library*. Henceforth, Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action*.

¹¹⁰Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 189.

¹¹¹Karl Jaspers, *The Perennial Scope of Philosophy*, trans. Ralph Manheim (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, 1950), 48, *Z-library*. Henceforth, Jaspers, *The Perennial Scope of Philosophy*.

¹¹²Calcagno, *Edith Stein*, 17, 29, 71.

¹¹³Stein, *On the Problem of Empathy*, 7, 77.

¹¹⁴Stein, *On the Problem of Empathy*, 19.

When we get someone to communicate, our distress ... through sympathy we are off-loaded some of distresses, disappointments and sorrows. That experience of someone joining us in our feelings Smith asserts... constitute the sole consolation in life¹¹⁵.

Additionally, Habermas alludes that, in communication community; individuals reach their self-realizations by mutually communicating in freedom, whereby; they speak loud their thoughts, establish moral arguments and judgements, command or promise, agree or disagree, encounter one another in the horizon of unrestricted infinite possibilities, transmit knowledge and in solidarity develop personal identities, communication thus, is a 'universal discourse' motivated by language that blends 'harmony of mind' with 'harmony of things' and in sentimental affection accept the strengths and weakness of others¹¹⁶.

4.1.3 Empathetic intersubjective life We-Community

Scheler points out that, a community constitutes and affirms the vitality of mutual feelings and the fabric of social moral life¹¹⁷. Zahavi notes that, through the analysis of empathy, many thinkers have recognised intersubjectivity as a platform for socialization¹¹⁸. For Stein, individuals with communal life-sense not mere social unions constitute a community, where individuals carry the character of the community, and the community changes with the change of individual character¹¹⁹.

Community for Stein is made out of solidarity, an experience whereby individuals live in a we- experience¹²⁰, with the collective feelings of you and I yielding the we-feeling of higher categories of subjects¹²¹. The reciprocity among individuals becomes a communal transaction that blends a unity of life of lived-living experiences¹²². These experiences of the community are indelible substrates that each subject carry within in every moment and place, a community is hence, 'what we live' it depicts the structure of collective intentionality and ontology of sociality¹²³.

Stein argues that, we become fully conscious of ourselves as human persons when interacting with people and what catalyses this interaction argues Stein, is empathy¹²⁴. Through empathy, individuals learn to co-exist by living as members of the community with a sense of a communal teleology¹²⁵. When individuals live, feel and act as members of the community, the community lives, feels and acts in them and through them¹²⁶. Hence, in a community every individual participates in its state of affairs with a sense of communal feeling¹²⁷. This communal feeling contains life community that permeates intersubjectivity, grounds the basis upon which human persons socially and communally transcend and transect their multiple individual horizons into a one communal horizon of existence.

Stein explicitly gives the difference in meaning and intentionality between a crowd-mass, society and community¹²⁸. She presents a crowd as a contingent social formation of people whose disposition is to imitate other people emotional expressions and behaviours, thus, easily waved by the tidings of mass contagions and suggestions that lack a we intentional collectivity¹²⁹. The society and the community have a we or a collective intentionality, however, a society argues Stein, icons Marxism class struggle and segregations of other people, as they are treated as objects

¹¹⁵Adam Smith, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, ed. D. D. Raphael & A. L. Macfie. *The Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith* (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1982), 15, 21-22, *Z-library*. Henceforth, Smith, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*.

¹¹⁶Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action*, 43, 55, 68, 72-74, 96, 120, 137, 145, 149.

¹¹⁷Cf. Scheler, *The Nature of Sympathy*, 72, 233.

¹¹⁸Zahavi, *Self and Other*, 194.

¹¹⁹Cf. Stein, *Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities*, 271.

¹²⁰Magri & Moran, *Empathy, Sociality, and Personhood*, 144.

¹²¹Stein, *On the Problem of Empathy*, 17.

¹²²Stein, *Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities*, 236.

¹²³Calcagno, *Edith Stein*, 50.

¹²⁴Calcagno, *Edith Stein*, 39.

¹²⁵Calcagno, *Edith Stein*, 17.

¹²⁶Stein, *Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities*, 167.

¹²⁷Stein, *Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities*, 185.

¹²⁸Calcagno, *Edith Stein*, 30.

¹²⁹Cf. Stein, *Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities*, 158-59, 190-91, 283-84. See also, Cf. A. Calcagno, *Edith Stein*, 31.

not subjects, a society thus, is an expression of we are different¹³⁰, and this difference is for egoistic interests¹³¹. Therefore, just as Levinas or Marcel, Stein's empathetic perspective repudiates the mere spirit of objectifying others for egoistic interests, and demands taking others from a first person perspective, as subjects¹³².

Thus, it is only in the community where solidarity of collective intentionality exist, people are treated and valued as subjects¹³³. In the community, each person encounters the other as a subject with psycho-dynamisms, bonded together through mutual influence of communal solidarity and collective responsibility unlike in the society, where people bond together to pursue their monadic interests through their rational and mechanistic strategies¹³⁴.

Therefore, since solidarity reflects a communal flow of stream of experience of individual, according to Stein, solidarity constitutes an authentic community, whereby individuals carry out their responsibilities with freedom in the spirit of collective intentionality, so that being inauthentic in the community will entail escaping one's responsibility¹³⁵. For these reasons, a community is made up of free and responsible people with sentimental affection, sense of belonging and above all people help each other to actualize their potentialities, community is hence what we live, a vital substrate that enriches our humanity as persons¹³⁶.

For Stein it is absurd and impossible to think of a society without a community, but we can think of the community without the society, for brutality that exist in the society results, from the lost sense of the communal aspect with its mutual exchange of life-force¹³⁷. Empathetic community is hence, for subject living-bodies not object-bodies¹³⁸. We can only access the life of the alter ego that shapes our identity through an empathetic intersubjective act that create a we-community, which is the real subject of empathy and whereby living-body subjects remain unique from each other but not separated¹³⁹.

Therefore, in the life community, subjects empathetically connect and communicate to constitute an empathetic intersubjective space, which fosters negotiation and engagement of accepting different perspectives of persons. Hence making empathetic intersubjectivity a phenomenon of a communal human life, that pursues the relationships of shared sets of intentions, meanings and practices of being in solidarity with others in a mutual empathetic horizon of existence. Interestingly, in the realm of solidarity subjects turns to each other, ask, invite and demand for moral evaluations and judgement of personal characters to be admired or repudiated¹⁴⁰.

A community thus constitutes the genuine social essence of human being. Scheler for example, points out that every individual in a human community, is not just part of the society but a sociable being, with the society being an essential part of an individual who is, a member of the we-community that is based on God's love, God to person and person to person, so much so that the other is a phenomenon of coupling¹⁴¹. For Scheler therefore, man is always community oriented, he reaches and participates in the being of the others through co-performance because of the perception of other bodily expressions¹⁴². As Schutz argues, mutual relation is for a we-relationship of mutual engagement of lived experiences that are open and accessible to one another, in which people grow old together through joint interactional activities¹⁴³.

¹³⁰Cf. Stein, *Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities*, 169, 252, 319-22.

¹³¹Calcagno, *Edith Stein*, 31.

¹³²Magri & Moran, *Empathy, Sociality, and Personhood*, 74, 136.

¹³³Cf. Calcagno, *Edith Stein*, 31, 41, 53.

¹³⁴Stein, *Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities*, 131, 158, 201, 194, 222-23, 243-44, 315.

¹³⁵Calcagno, *Edith Stein*, 56-57.

¹³⁶Cf. Calcagno, *Edith Stein*, 3, 28, 49-50, 54-57.

¹³⁷Calcagno, *Edith Stein*, 33, 51.

¹³⁸Calcagno, *Edith Stein*, 41.

¹³⁹Manganaro, "The Roots of Intersubjectivity – Empathy and Phenomenology" 279, 284.

¹⁴⁰Cf. Stein, *Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities*, 296-97.

¹⁴¹Cf. Scheler, *Nature of Sympathy*, 229-30.

¹⁴²Thomas J. Owens, *Phenomenology and Intersubjectivity; Contemporary Interpretations of the Interpersonal Situation* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970), 53, 71, Z-library. Henceforth, Owens, *Phenomenology and Intersubjectivity*.

¹⁴³Cf. Schutz, *The Phenomenology of the Social World*, 172, 180-81.

When individuals socially interact in the community, asserts Stein they reveal the community life-force, because it is through the individuals that the community gets its unique character, since individuals are carriers of community life¹⁴⁴. Stein points out further that, it is for the good of humans that the state-community, which is meaningful for political functions should exist¹⁴⁵, to make humanity a single community of noble subjects with co-responsibility¹⁴⁶. Therefore, individuals constitute a community whose character is revealed through its members, who are the carriers of its community life and common good. However, the community that is the whole is greater than an individual who is the part.

Therefore, through empathetic connectivity, we blend an empathetic communication as a therapy in constituting a life we-community, characterised with lasting communal and interpersonal relationships that are morally nourished. MacIntyre asserts that, Stein believed that philosophy has to be cognised as an adventure and a propagation of Plato's philosophical enterprise, whose conclusion makes philosophy a necessary subject of life, Stein thus, is to be remembered not from how she asked questions but how she gave remarkable conclusion about others, the self and social life¹⁴⁷.

Conclusion

Empathy and intersubjectivity have been resonating phenomenological puzzlements in various horizons of human existence. We have perceived how empathy as; an intentional, motivational and meaningful act blends empathetic connection, communication and life community based on lived-living experiences of living bodies of human subjects. Empathy hence, remains an integral phenomenological tenet and a philosophical legislator of intersubjectivity, with the idea of person-to-person that grounds intersubjectivity springing empathetically through the zero point of orientation, bringing oneself to the experiences of the alien consciousness. Empathy also plays a pivotal role in the formation of morally sociable and an intersubjective community, so much so that our moral and sociable values are a product of us being in communion. Empathetic intersubjectivity thus, promotes the spirit of dialogue and communication, strengthens interaction of cultural-social activities and enhances the development of personalities and moral values of subjects. This is why empathetic intersubjectivity, is the philosophy of human person with communal moral values based on the lived-living bodily experiences. Empathy thus, is a solid vital force that cements intersubjective communal interaction and ethical interrelationships, whereby human life is an engaged activity of social-communal ethical life.

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¹⁴⁴MacIntyre, *Edith Stein; A Philosophical Prologue*, 121, 129, 137.

¹⁴⁵Calcagno, *Edith Stein*, 32.

¹⁴⁶Cf. Gabriel J. Costello, *The Teaching of Design and Innovation; Principles and Practices* (Cham, Switzerland: Springer Nature Switzerland AG, 2020), 36, 43, *Z-library*. Henceforth, Costello, *The Teaching of Design and Innovation*.

¹⁴⁷MacIntyre, *Edith Stein; A Philosophical Prologue*, 1-3, 75.

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