THE RELEVANCE OF WITTEGNSTEIN'S PHILOSOPHY OF MIND TODAY.

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Abstract: In contemporaryphilosophy, a number of philosophers including; Rene Descartes, John Searle, and John Locke have contributed much in analysing the question of philosophy of mind. They have all displayed the role of philosophy of mind in different fields of study like technology (Artificial Intelligence), epistemology, psychology and economics. Wittgenstein's analysis of the philosophy of mind has contributed a lot in such fields of study, thus in this paper we intend to display the relevance of Wittgenstein's philosophy of mind

Keywords: Intelligence, Language, Mind, Relevance,

Introduction

In this paper we will present the relevance of Wittgenstein's philosophy of mind today guided by few theories like; behaviourism, functionality, and intentionality which are the foundation for our presentation on the relevance of Wittgenstein's philosophy of mind today. Thus, we will discuss the relevance of Wittgenstein's philosophy of mind today in virtue of its relationship to other fields of study like technology (Artificial Intelligence), epistemology, psychology, and economics.

1.1 Artificial Intelligence

Here, basically we intend to briefly discuss the relationship between minds and machines. Since understanding a machine depends on understanding the mind using that machine, mind takes a central point in this philosophical discussion. This will be explained based on the three ways of discussing the relationship between minds and machines within the philosophy of mind: *mirroring*, *design* and *use* which occupy an important role in artificial intelligence.

1.1.1 Computers and Mirror relation

To say that a mind and a machine mirror each other is to say that they share some important structural features, so that some aspects of both systems can be explained by reference to this common structure. Comparisons between minds and machines have an interesting history within the mechanistic sciences, and have influence across a variety of methodological programs within the philosophy of mind and the cognitive sciences (Haugeland, 1997).One way in which machines are of interest in the philosophy of mind is for their ability to mirror important structural features of the mind, or to formally model the operations of the mind and its subsystems. Since computers allow us to model processes to subjective levels of abstraction, computers are one of the more well-represented machines in contemporary philosophy of mind (Haugeland, 1997).

Dennett for instance, elaborates on the importance of computers in this inspiring passage:

Computers are mind like in ways that no earlier artifacts were: they can control processes that perform tasks that call for discrimination, inference, memory, judgment, anticipation; they are generators of new knowledge, finders of patterns; in poetry, astronomy, and mathematics, for instance; that heretofore only human beings could even hope to find. We now have real world artifacts that dwarf Leibniz's giant mill both in speed and intricacy… The sheer existence of computers has provided an existence proof of undeniable influence: there are mechanisms–brute, mysterious mechanisms operating according to routinely well-understood physical principles–that have many of the competences heretofore assigned only to minds (Dennett, 2000).

Therefore, computers are mind-like not only because they can perform tasks that bear some similarity to the operations of minds, but also because computation is a universal method for modeling any formal process. Insofar as the operations of the mind can be modeled computationally, a computer can be built in a way that it performs those operations and therefore mirrors the mind, at least at that level of abstraction.Consequently, computers serve as more than merely a powerful demonstration for interpreting the mind; they also motivate a theoretically basic approach for guiding research into the nature of the mind.

Haugeland, for instance, puts the point quite clearly that: "The guiding inspiration of cognitive science is that, at a suitable level of abstraction, a theory of 'natural' intelligence should have the same basic form as the theories that explain sophisticated computer systems." (Haugeland, 1981). Thus, in that line of thinking, the guiding assumption of cognitive science that computation is a common feature of both computing machinery and intelligent systems, has been one of the major philosophical battle grounds over the last forty years (Ladyman, 2007). It is in the context of this discussion that the debate over artificial intelligence arises. The terms of the debate are stated quite clearly in Searle's distinction between 'strong' and 'weak'Artificial Intelligence (AI):

According to weak AI, the principal value of the computer in the study of the mind is that it gives us a very powerful tool. For example, it enables us to formulate and test hypotheses in a more rigorous and precise fashion. But according to strong AI, the computer is not merely a tool in the study of the mind; rather, the appropriately programmed computer really is a mind, in the sense that computers given the right programs can be literally said to understand and have other cognitive states (Searle, 1980).Searle draws a distinction between treating a computer as a tool, and treating the computer as a mind, and it is this latter case that motivates the debate over artificial intelligence. Searle sees no philosophical issue with using computers to aid in the scientific study of the mind, or the proposal that they might mirror at least some formal features found in biologically intelligent systems.

The philosophical argument arises when these computer models are taken to be genuine minds in their own right, a proposal which Searle rejects. On Searle's view, then, recognition of certain structurally mirroring relations between minds and machines is entirely compatible with conceiving of the machine as a tool.On Searle's view, then, recognition of certain structurally mirroring relations between minds and machines is entirely compatible with conceiving of the machine as a tool. Thus, if cognitive science holds that the best explanation of the mind is given in computational terms, then a computer that successfully mirrors all the relevant computational features of a mind is just a mind, and its status as a tool drops out (Searle, 1980).

Haugeland on the other hand, makes this point clear that: "If the product is specified in terms of a computational structure, then a working model could probably be manufactured much more easily by means of electronics and programming; and that's the only relevance of the technology." (Haugeland, 1981).Therefore, the debate on Artificial Intelligence turns into a debate over whether computing machinery is actually capable of mirroring all the important structural features of mind, so that the operations of the mind can be understood in terms of computational processes.

1.1.2 Design

This discussion is influenced by the theory of intentionality and functionality. On the standard view of artifacts as tools, the designer's intent can be decisive in classifying a particular machine as a tool. On this view, the process of design fills an artifact with a purpose or function through creative construction. Thus, it is tempting to think that the relevant relationship between minds and tools is properly understood in terms of the tool's relationship to its designer. Dennett's (1987) 'design stance' is an interpretative framework in which the behavior of some object is explained by appeal to features of its design and functionality. Dennett's position may weigh the discussion too heavily against the standard view of artifacts.

Specifically, Dennett argues that although the mental states of an intentional agent figure into a design stance explanation for some systems, others systems might require explanations that simply make reference to the teleological orientation of a mechanical function with no presumptions about the activity of intentional agents (Dennett, 1989).Dennett suggests that a spontaneous electrical spark in a room with leaky gas might be functionally described from the design stance as a 'detonator', with reference to the functional role played by the spark in subsequent events, but without making any presumptions about the mental activity of intentional agents informing that function (Dennett, 1989). If the detonator is a machine that has acquired a function independent of human minds, then the example demonstrates that not all machines are tools.

As an event it is equivalent to other natural processes described simply in terms of causal regularity in a physical world, and therefore lies outside the discussion of artifacts that is concerned here. If the spark acquires a functional description at all, it is only as a result of the fictional narrative of the design stance itself, with which we might usefully describe the phenomenon by way of analogy to genuine functional artifacts: the spark merely functions as if it were a detonator (Searle, 2003), but interpreting the spark from this stance does not make it a genuine detonator. It should be noted here that Clark's extended mind thesis explicitly rejects the importance of design in considering the nature of tools. Clark argues that the causal history of a tool, including the history of its design and construction, is at best a temporally distant feature of a machine that might not play any role in the way a machine is employed by its user as they engage in some task (Clark & Chalmers, 1998).

In Clark's view it is in the moment of use that a machine becomes a tool. For Clark, a tool is not merely a designed artifact; a tool is a machine that aids and extends the normal operations of the mind and body. Thus, it is in the application or employment of a tool that the crucial relationship between minds and machines is found (Clark & Chalmers, 1998).In order to treat Clark's argument against the centrality of design, it will help to say a few words about his general approach to technological artifacts.Clark's defense of the extended mind thesis consistently emphasizes the role technology plays in supporting the operations of the mind. Clark puts the point as follows: "Real embodied intelligence," or what Clark calls 'biological cognition' "is fundamentally a means of engaging with the world… The image here is of two coupled complex systems (the agent and the environment) whose joint activity solves the problem." (Clark, 1998). Thus, the world actively contributes to the problem-solving tasks which the mind is oriented to solve.

Therefore, as the environment is populated by an increasing variety of technological resources designed for particular problem-solving tasks, and as these resources become ever more reliably available for coupling, the possibilities open to the agent for engaging the world are multiplied. In the researcher view, the following example will help in understanding this idea: consider someone whose biological brain is quite poor at doing division calculations in mathematics. Nevertheless, that person is confident in his or her ability to do long division, because he or she has easy access to pen and paper and a numerical order for representing the relationships among numbers. The ability to do long division depends no less on these external technological resources than on the biological or human mind.

Thus, by adding a calculator to the person's resources, his or her ability to do math is again extremely increased in both accuracy and efficiency. Of course, technological mind extensions are not limited to purely formal or cognitive domains. For instance, on Clark's view it would be quite natural to say that most of the knowledge about how to open a can is found in the can opener. On Clark's view, the connection of the agent and the tool in the process of use is a dynamic event that unfolds as a problem is being solved. In specific, the intentions of the tool's designer are at best a temporally and causally distant feature of the tool's history, and are entirely passive in the moment of connection.

Clark's skepticism of the role of distant causal features in describing behavior is clear in his and Chalmers' attempts to distinguish their brand of externalism from Putnam and Burge style anti-individualism: "In [Twin Earth] cases, the relevant external features are *passive*. Because of their distal nature, they play no role in driving the cognitive process in the here-and-now… In the cases we describe, by contrast, the relevant external features are *active*, playing a crucial role in the here-and-now. Because they are coupled with the human organism, they have a direct impact on the organism and on its behavior. In these cases, the relevant parts of the world are *in the loop*, not dangling at the other end of a long causal chain. Concentrating on this sort of coupling leads us to an *active externalism*, as opposed to the passive externalism of Putnam and Burge." (Clark & Chalmers, 1998).

Here, Clark's discussion of Putnam and Burge in this context is to some extent curious. The latter 'externalist' views were offered as part of a causal theory of mental content that links a word with its referent. Clark's externalism does not try to explain the relationship between word and object, but instead seeks to expand the class of systems that can function as the active bearers of mental content. For instance, John's notepad, if used in the right way, can store John's beliefs in the same way that Irene's brain stores her beliefs. Therefore, the distinction between active and passive externalism is meant to emphasize that John's notebook becomes part of John's mental tool set as John uses it, so the relevant relationship between John's beliefs and John's notepad is entirely captured in the interactions between the two in the moment of connecting.Clark's point here in relation to the researcher's example is that the causal histories of John and his notepad are irrelevant in describing this interaction.

In fact, familiarization with an object can not only reveal its uses as a tool, but can also uncover previously hidden problems that it is unexpectedly fit to solve. This process of discovery can be a consequence of unstructured, unguided manipulation of an object by an agent, and can occur without any prior knowledge of the object's design history. It is in the direct interaction with the objects that a tool is found to be suitable to a task. Clark sums up and expands on Dennett's point:One of Dennett's major themes is thus that the initial path and successful tool use need not involve a process of design in which thoughts about the tool/problem fit guide a search for good tools. Instead, recognition of tool/problem fit, if it comes at all, May well comes after the event of successful use. In fact, we can go further and observe that not just the discovery of tools, but also their evolution, improvement and refinement, can proceed with little or no deliberate design activity on our part." (Clark, 2002b).

Even if the behavior of the tool is constrained by its design, Clark follows Dennett in holding that a successful instance of use can occur without any explicit involvement of the design process. While the process of design may inform how an object is used, for instance when one consults the user's manual to decipher the intentions of the designer and the functionality of the machine, on Clark's view the only systems involved in a particular problem solving task are the agent and the tool in the moment of coupling. Tools become extensions of the mind as they are used, regardless of their history of design (Clark, 2002b).

There are, of course, other reasons to be interested in the design relationship that are beyond the purview of this limited discussion. As mentioned above, it is natural to think that the proper functioning of a tool is tied to its original design. The proper function of a hammer is to drive nails, since it was designed with the purpose of driving nails; and this remains the case, even if it is never actually used for these or any other ends. In Clark's view, however, a machine finds its function in the process of being used, and this process depends on the user recognizing the fit between problem and tool. A broken hammer, for example, will do a poor job of driving nails, so the user interested in accomplishing that task must turn away from a broken hammer (Clark, 2002b). Because Clark is interested in the way minds employ their environmental resources to accomplish their goals, it is in the moment of use that a tool becomes a relevant in explaining the behavior of the organism.

1.1.3 Users and Mind-tools

Clark's focus on the use of a machine in the moment of coupling or connection reveals an important relationship between minds and machines that often goes unaddressed in discussions of the mirroring and design relationships. The human brain and mind play a fairly reduced but no less important role as a central coordinator in control of employing its external tools to solve its various tasks. In other words, the human mind is reimagined as a user, whose capacities as an agent depend on its continued integration with the technological support at its disposal.

On Clark's view, understanding the relationship between minds and tools just amounts to understanding the way a mind employs the tool in the moment of coupling. For Clark, the capacity for integration with a technologically robust environment is at the very core of human intelligence. "What is special about human brains, and what best explains the distinctive features of human intelligence, is precisely their ability to enter into deep and complex relationships with non biological constructs, props, and aids." (Clark, 2002b).

The emphasis on technology adds a layer of complexity to an explanation of the mind, since who or what counts as 'the user' remains an open question. Clark's response is perhaps shocking: "No one uses the mind-tools. The mind is the collection of mind-tools." (Clark, 2002b).Clark continues, again drawing from Dennett:"What we really need to reject, I suggest, is the seductive idea that all these various neural and non-neural tools need a kind of privileged user. Instead, it is just tools, all the way down... No single tool among this complex kit is intrinsically thoughtful ultimately in control, or the 'seat of the self.' We, meaning human individuals, just are these shifting coalitions of tools." (Clark, 2004).

Clark's worries about the 'user' originates from a general skepticism about the framing of the traditional mind-body problem; retaining a notion of a privileged user threatens to reintroduce ananimate thing that is ultimately in control of coordinating the activities of the mind. If the tools associated with an extended mind must also center on a user, then the appeal to technological support does not help explain the mind but merely reintroduces the problem at a lower level of analysis: to explain the mind is ultimately a matter of explaining the animate user (Clark, 2004).

However, Clark's rejection of a privileged user threatens to undermine the explanatory power gained by viewing the mind in terms of its integration with its technological surroundings. While there may be no privileged user that retains control of the overall agent, there must be some coordinating agent organizing the activity of the tools, even

if the particular mind-tool that acts as coordinator changes depending on the features of a given task (Clark, 2004). As discussed above, it is in the process of being used that a tool is made to fit a problem.

1.1.4 Users and Agents

For Clark, biological intelligence is found in the coupling of the agent and the environment in the moment of activity. However, the agent is not simply the mind or even the whole biological organism, since the agent's ability to solve a specific task depends on the mind's ability to integrate with its tool-loaded surroundings. The external resources are literally part of the mind, storing beliefs and helping to offload resource-intensive processes for tasks the agent hopes to solve.To make sense of this view, it is important to distinguish between the user and the agent. The user plays the role of central coordinator among the set of tools, though the user's agency depends on its ability to incorporate with its environmental scaffolding. The agent, extended across internal and external tools, is the collection of tools ultimately charged with the task of action thus coordinated (Clark, 2004).

The following familiar examples that will help clarify the distinction. When someone drives a car to work, there is a clear sense in which that person uses the car as a tool to achieve the ends. That person is engaged in the role of controlling and coordinating certain aspects of the vehicle's behavior in order to reach the destination. But the agent that ultimately accomplishes the task is the combined system that incorporates both the person and the vehicle.The implication here is that, the biological body alone cannot solve the problem of long-distance travel in the time settings required to achieve the ends, and the car is likewise unable to fulfill these ends without a brain and body behind the driver's seat directing its activity. It is only when a functioning car is perfectly integrated with a competent driver that the task can be accomplished. So the entire integrated system is properly identified as the agent and is ultimately responsible for achieving these ends.

Therefore, identifying the complete integrated system as the agent has immediate consequences for how we understand the behavior of the agents we encounter on the road. It is the combined system, for instance, that other drivers on the road interact with as they navigate the shared road space (Clark, 2004).Clark slides back and forth over the user and agent distinction, which results in some confusion over how he treats the role of the user. For instance, Clark motivates the user-tool gap byappeal to phenomenological facts, which he describes as "the way things seem to the agent." (Clark, 2002b).

On the careful user and agent distinction discussed above, this description of the phenomenological facts is a mistake; there might be many coordinating 'users' in the car, but actually the driveris the coordinator among others with subjective conscious experiences. The tools can only properly seem some particular way to the user, because it is the user that coordinates the activity of the tool.Therefore, there is no reason to think the car seems any particular way to the human-car complex as an agent, for instance, even when the car does seem more or less transparent to its human user. That is because, the user might also be an agent, but its agency as a user is distinct from its agency in virtue of its use of some tool, the way that the driver's coordinating activity of driving is only one component in the activity the human-car complex takes as it moves down the road.

1.2 Material Economy

Ludwig Wittgenstein's notion of the language game has significant implications for how the money economy is considered today. Money is primarily a linguistic entity, a sort of text that trades for anything and everything. This means that money is worthless unless constituted by the human language which defines its communicable worth, for communicability constitutes worth. In other words, on the researcher's opinion money is not printed: money is spoken.Therefore, when Wittgenstein's notion of the language game is applied to the economic sphere; the notion reveals that the economic sphere is really a subsection of the linguistic sphere. That is,the economic sphere exists by virtue of the sphere of human communicability. Therefore, the language game of money, like the language game of phenomenalism, refers to liquid referents (something referred to; the object of reference), that is, inexistent referents. Money, therefore, is a play of shadows and not a system of real value-regulation and reward.

In the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Wittgenstein's theory of logical propositions reveals the significant route that human symbols take in coming to their realization. Like any other symbol, money fulfills its function through symbolism. After discussing the relationship between the 'picture' of mental representation and space, Wittgenstein proposes that "the picture cannot place itself outside of its form of representation." (Wittgenstein, 1961). It is therefore stuck, similar to material so far beyond comprehension of things as they are in themselves.

Wittgenstein continues to propose that "What the picture represents is its sense." (Wittgenstein, 1961). Following that, he writes "In the agreement or disagreement of its sense with reality, its truth or falsity consists." (Wittgenstein, 1961). The picture, thus, can be deformed by human misunderstanding, by improper deduction; but the picture is not in itself true, because it is simply representational rather than identical. In the same line of thought, Wittgenstein adds that "There is no picture which is *a priori* true." (Wittgenstein, 1961). At this point Wittgenstein begins to dissect the forms of human symbolism, as embodied in atomic facts and their signs.

Therefore, where the suggestive application of Wittgenstein's philosophy of linguistics applies to money as it mediates material economy, and where it postulates as a text rather than a proper value-form, then money becomes a permanent concept that somehow comprises the economy as a whole despite its purely linguistic status. This is relevant today in a way that when someone holds a dollar in the hand, its textual nature is the one considered, the fact that it is a symbol which has no real value beyond that of mediation. Thus, the spoken language of money proves sufficient without the aid of currency.

Wittgenstein continues to write that "an *a priori* true thought would be one whose possibility guaranteed its truth." (Wittgenstein, 1961). Here Wittgenstein returnsto the language of material economy, in the 'guarantee' of logic (guarantee being the method by which debts are repaid). But, since money is not *a priori* true but a mere social agreement that exists within the category of truth, it offers no guarantee as to its worth, which seems to be comparable to human life. The implication here is that, money is a representation of truth, not a truth in itself. That is why Wittgenstein writes that "we could only know *a priori* that a thought is true if its truth was to be recognized from the thought itself (without an object of comparison)." (Wittgenstein, 1961).To confirm the role money plays analogously to the object of Wittgenstein's criticism, he writes; "that the propositional sign is a fact is concealed by the ordinary form of expression, written or printed… For in the printed proposition, for example, the sign of a proposition does not appear essentially different from a word." (Wittgenstein, 1961).

Therefore, money which is the economic sign is significant when it is well presented in the grammar of the subjects using it during the transactions; for instance, when a business man is purchasing sugar at a certain price from an industry that sells sugar. Both the buyer and seller aim at the transaction that is for the ultimate profit. Thus, if it happens that both subjects fail to communicate properly through the medium of money, the purchase fails.Thus, in brief it is clear that Wittgenstein's notion of language game has contributed much to how material economy is considered today as discussed by the researcher in the above. Wittgenstein's emphasis is that money is worthless unless constituted by the human language which defines its communicable worth. Therefore, money which is the economic sign signifies its worth when it is well presented in the grammar of the subjects (seller and customer) presenting it for the desired transaction.

1.3 Cognitive Psychology

Wittgenstein shows an open interest in psychology, as some of his works clearly demonstrate, such as *The Blue and Brown Books* and *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology* which is presented in 2 Volumes. Also, Part II of the *PhilosophicalInvestigations* is concerned with psychological concepts, both specifically and general remarks about concepts. Wittgenstein interest and descriptions of behaviour are used only to show his views on the practice of language and language use. Furthermore, Wittgenstein sees the limitations of behaviourism and, thus, for him, there evolves an emphasis on 'the mind' and 'the mental'. His language-game shows the context in which a concept is participatory, which is a key feature of personified and situated cognition. Therefore, Wittgenstein illustrates how the mind and the body, along with the environment, and a participating concept, all engage together.

In the *PhilosophicalInvestigations*, Wittgenstein is essentially objecting to the idea that mental states are considered in isolation from the social environment and any social context. Furthermore, he maintains that empirical psychological explanations can be given of behaviour (Williams, Meredith. 1999).The *PhilosophicalInvestigations* clarifies language as a social and systematic process where the role that language plays in how we think and behave in the world is seen. Thus, Wittgenstein holds that language is intrinsically social. Wittgenstein also shows a significant interest and understanding of not just language, as it is used in any language-game or context, but also of what is referred to as a private language, which he claims is impossible. For some analysts, Wittgenstein's attack on the possibility of a private language shows that meaning, for example, must be a manifestation of behaviour. (Byrne, 1994).

When Wittgenstein speaks of a private language he is referring to language that cannot be understood by anyone other than the speaker:The individual words of this language are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language (Wittgenstein, 2009).

Therefore, in the *PhilosophicalInvestigations*, it is seen how the structure of language determines the way in which we think of the 'real' world and, therefore, our experience of the 'real' world. For example, we are able to determine what counts as one object or two objects or even the same object; in fact it enables us to determine what counts as an object at all (Searle, 1997).Thus, Wittgenstein argues that we do not give private definitions of sensation words or concepts, but rather sensation language:our language for describing inner experiences, is a part of a public, social phenomena.

In that line of thinking, for Wittgenstein, our ordinary sensation language is not a private language because we learn and use the terms and concepts of this language in conjunction with public criteria or public phenomena that is clearly delineated and only learned through behaviour and context-dependent situations. However, an issue that should be considered is how words can be linked or refer to sensations. Thus, sensations fall into Wittgenstein's private language because only the individual experiencing the 'pain', for instance, can know whether he or she is actually in 'pain'; another can only assume the level of pain involved. For Wittgenstein, someone is either in pain or not in pain, and that descriptive terms such as 'knowing' and 'certainty' should be ignored; they become irrelevant, and meaningless in the individual's experience of the 'pain' itself (Searle, 1997).

Following that line of thought, then the expression should be: 'I am in pain' or 'I am not in pain'. Therefore, it is true and valid to say that others can genuinely claim that they can doubt another's experience of pain, but that the individual itself can say with certainty that 'I am in pain' and not doubt it. Although issues concerning truth and validity mistakes can be made about the external world, judgements about our immediate and directly personal sensations and not sensations stored in memory, can only be true (Searle, 1997).For Wittgenstein, the 'external' world is where we experience a communal and shared system. It is in this external world that we engage with contexts and where concepts become participatory.Therefore, Wittgenstein considers language as the symbolic representation of sensory experience. Wittgenstein considers that concepts and words derive their meaning from the contexts in which they are used, and these contexts are built upon social constructs through a systematic process, and on forms of life.

1.4 Environment

Here, we intend to explain the relationship between 'embodied minds' and the 'surrounding world' which need to be considered in order to understand cognition as an interaction between an individual organism and the social as well as cultural environment, and how cognitive works get done. Wittgenstein's contribution in understanding this relationship will be employed with relevant examples to make the explanations hold value.

In support of behaviourism theory, Anderson in his article, *How to Read the Mind: An Introduction to Embodied Cognition*, claims that epistemic actions are illustrative of only one of two categories of methods by which organisms can use the environment to simplify and aid tasks: subsequently therefore organisms exploit what might be considered stable environmental features to simplify and aid cognitive tasks, and organisms change the environment to simplify and aid cognitive tasks. He holds that: "We off-load cognitive work onto the environment because of limits on our information processing abilities …we exploit the environment to reduce the cognitive workload." (Anderson, 2007).Therefore, this suggests that cognition should not just be considered as an 'in the head' activity but as a context that involves the mind, body and environment.

The implication here is that, whatever agent drives cognition in an individual does not exist only in the mind: it is an interaction between the individual and the specific context the individual is interacting with. Thus, it can be held that the environment is part of the cognitive system, as Wittgenstein remarks that:Am I to say that anyone who has an intention has an experience of tending towards something? That there are particular experiences of 'tending'?—Remember this case: if one urgently wants to make some remark, some objection, in a discussion, it often happens that one opens one's mouth, draws breath and holds it; if one then decides to let the objection go, one lets the breath out. The experience of this process is evidently the experience of tending towards something. Anyone who observes me will know that I wanted to say something and then thought better of it (Anderson, 2007).

Since cognition is considered as a context that involves the mind, body and environment; it is quite evident that many psychological processes have their roots in the need for action. The claim that Cognition is for action can be seen in Wittgenstein's remark: "No one will say that every time I enter my room, my long-familiar surroundings, there is enacted a recognition of all that I see and have seen hundreds of times before." (Wittgenstein, 2009).This suggests that the cognitive system is also a behavioural control system. The implication here is that, perception and memory are central to the claim that cognition is for action, and how these two cognitive processes contribute to situation-appropriate behaviour.Therefore, the purpose of vision or perception is to develop an internal representation for an individual of what is perceived, and then using memory as a cognitive process, to store this information either in short term (working) memory or semantic or occasional memory.

Thus, when the cognitive process of memory is considered, whether it is working memory, semantic or episodic, it should be understood in terms of an activity that allows us to encounter and conceptualize objects, contexts and situations in terms of their functionality. However, what is certain is that mental concepts contain important information for the perceiver; the information that can be relied on and used in many and varied contexts.To illustrate this point, the relevant example is of a wooden piano in a room where a non-musician could use it as a bench to sit on or a flat surface to place their drink on. However, prior knowledge and experience can also allow someone to see the piano in a range of unforeseen contexts such as: using it as an instrument to draw the attention of a roomful of people, or to block the door against an intruder. All these uses are derived from stored knowledge or representation of the piano.

Conclusion

This paper has presented the relevance of Wittgenstein's philosophy of mind today guided by few theories in philosophy of mind such as behaviourism, functionality, and picture theory which were discussed as the foundation for the presentation on the relevance of Wittgenstein's philosophy of mind today. Thus, we briefly discussed the relevance of Wittgenstein's philosophy of mind today in virtue of its relationship to other fields of study like technology, epistemology, psychology, and economics.In a summary, there are four features of the mental phenomena which guide us in understanding the concept of philosophy of mind and its relevance today. These features include; consciousness, intentionality, subjectivity, and mental causation.Therefore, any satisfactory account of the mind and of mind-body relations must take account of all four features.

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