AN ANALYSIS OF CONTEMPORARY PHENOMENOLOGY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND

Authors: **Sabas Kimani,**

Department of philosophy, The Catholic University of Eastern Africa

DOI: https://doi.org/10.56293/IJASR.2023.5603

IJASR 2023
VOLUME 6
ISSUE 6 NOVEMBER – DECEMBER **ISSN: 2581-7876**

Abstract: In the 21st century Philosophy of mind is naturally understood in terms of a certain historical progression. After rejecting introspection as unreliable, some behaviorists sought to understand the mind strictly in terms of widely available data. Nevertheless, behaviorism cannot account for certain inner feelings and states, so the identity theory emerged as a viable physicalist alternative. The identity theory posits a strict, reductive identity between brain states and mental states. However, the one-to-one link between psychological terms and corresponding physical terms was problematic, since terms like "pain" seem to have many relations to physical kinds. To address this issue functionalists described mental states in terms of a kind of finite machine or probabilistic mechanism, defined by a pattern of relationships between inputs, outputs, and other internal states. These structures have the attractive feature that they can multiply and be realized in different physical systems. Consequently, contemporary philosophy of mind has rediscovered phenomenology, notwithstanding in a fairly impoverished form. Contemporary philosophers of mind often address the "phenomenology" of a particular form of experience by inquiring whether "there is something that it is like" to undergo it. The phrase is suggestive, but it has led to a severe phenomenology, an account of the "small mental residue" that materialist theories leave unexplained. On the other hand, this narrow conception of phenomenology has been expanding. "Liberal" accounts of phenomenal character include emotional-affective, agentive, and cognitive experience. Intentionality has been pursued in an increasingly phenomenological way. These and related projects come closer to phenomenology as historically conceived, which was extremely rich in terms of its method, scope, and conceptual apparatus. In this article we give an overview of the phenomenological tradition. In addition, we survey some of the many ways phenomenology overlaps philosophy of mind, how they have shared historical origins in Brentano, Frege and Husserl; the areas of numerous thematic overlaps and the active collaborations. Finally, we shall argue about how phenomenology and philosophy mind can interact.

Keywords: Contemporary, Mind, Phenomenology, Philosophy

Introduction

Contemporary phenomenology and philosophy of mind are enormous areas of research, which include intentionality, perception, and metaphysics of mind, among others. The two areas come together at many points for instance think of two galaxies colliding. Nevertheless, the metaphor is not quite appropriate. They are not independent bodies of research that happen to overlap, but are rather two phases of a continuous tradition that diverged for a time and are now, at least partially, reintegrating. However, phenomenological problems emerged at the beginning of 1970s. Nagel (1974), and later Block (1980), Searle (1980), and Jackson (1982), pointed out that purely formal relations between states leave out the first-person, subjective character of consciousness. By the 1990's consciousness had become a central topic in philosophy of mind.

SYNOPSIS OF PHENOMENOLOGY

Phenomenology is often defined as the study of consciousness, or sometimes, the study of phenomena, i.e. things as they appear as opposed to things as they really are. Although there are problems with this definition as Husserl and Heidegger would have objections with it, it is helpful as a first authorization way of understanding what phenomenology is. The first of the classical phenomenologists, Husserl, developed the following first-person reflective method. He begins with the phenomenological reduction (Husserl 2014). The idea is to emphasis on lived experience in the natural attitude of daily life, and to describe it as accurately as possible. To do this, take some event

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of everyday life, put it in brackets and describe it. Perhaps we are aware of a book page or a computer screen as we read these words, as well as pictures or people in the background. We probably assume that things around us exist. Most of us are thus naïve realists in the natural attitude and in this way the method is supposed to differ from Descartes, that there is no active doubting, there is simply a description of whatever our epistemic attitude happens to be at a time.

Husserl divided these conscious states into their various parts, the study of parts and wholes, which he helped to develop (Varzi 2015). For instance, within the total field of consciousness he distinguishes intentional experiences or "acts" of consciousness as entities that can be further analyzed following his teacher Brentano, who emphasized intentionality as central to the perceptive process. Within intentional experiences of physical objects, Husserl distinguishes their sensory character from their more cognitive components. He also distinguishes one's sense of an object as an external object, from one's sense of self as perceiving the object. Several of the distinctions that Husserl made in his careful analyses of perceptual experience foreshadow contemporary debates about the metaphysics and epistemology of perceptual experience. For example, Husserl claims that perceptual experience consists of non-intentional sensory stuff in need of conceptual "interpretation" or "apprehension", a topic that tracks several current debates. One of Husserl's main innovations is his account of how objects given in intentional experience are "constituted" in webs of partial intentions, characterized by "motivation" relations and "horizon" structures (Husserl 2001). The idea is that my seeing a thing as being a certain way is founded on a pattern of counterfactual sensori-motor relationships between my current sensory experience and my immanent anticipations.

When we learn something about the object this information is sedimented in to our understanding of it. These changes in how we see things are studied by genetic phenomenology. In these and other ways reality is "constituted" for a person in flowing streams of experience. The study of how different features of experienced reality are related to conscious processes is what Husserl called the constitutive phenomenology.

Husserl made a distinction between two general types of phenomenological processes (Yoshimi 2009). On the one hand, there is a level of passive constitution, which does not involve attention or language. Basically, by interacting with things we get a sense of how they work. As we walk around a neighborhood, interact with a cat, we become familiar with how the neighborhood is laid out, or how the cat tends to behave. As surprises occur, we update our knowledge of these things. We change what we expect at a turn in the neighborhood, or how we expect the cat to respond to a new person. Whenever we see a thing, we implicitly bring all this indirectly acquired understanding to it, via what Husserl calls "passive synthesis". When, by contrast, we start to talk about things, using the explicit conceptual resources of a language, a second dynamics which is active and predicative becomes involved. Husserl describes in great detail how, in acts of comparing, contrasting, explicating, counting, relating, and so forth, we develop a more explicit, linguistically mediated sense of things. These conceptual structures have their own horizon-structures, a kind of linguistic network of associations and patterns that further inform how we experience things. These two processes have been used to understand Husserl's relation to social and embodied cognition (Walsh, 2014), cognitive science (Yoshimi, 2009), and perceptual content (Hopp, 2008).

Husserl also describes essences which are invariant features of a class of objects constituted in experience. He does so use a variation method that may have derived from the mathematical theory of calculus of variations he wrote his Ph.D. dissertation on (Yoshimi 2007). The idea is to take some object given in the field of experience, e.g. a perceived cup or passage of music, and then imagine arbitrary variations to it, while remaining in some larger region of being. The cup could be larger, a different color, etc., but still remain a physical thing. Features of the thing that remain constant through variation are essences. Husserl argued, that it is an essence of perceived physical things that we never perceive them all at once: no matter how we alter the cup, we are always only perceiving one part of it. This is the essential "one sidedness" of perception (Husserl, 2014). Essences impose necessary constraints on how the members of given class of objects or processes must appear in consciousness. Essences are known a *priori* and are necessarily true, according to Husserl. There are interesting questions about the practicability of phenomenology (Kasmier 2010) and its relation to rationalism, conceptual analysis, and contemporary epistemology. Husserl thought of phenomenology as an active, collaborative research program and not as a motionless doctrine. In *Logical Investigations* he refers to the "zig-zag" (Zickzack) manner of phenomenological inquiry, since the close interdependence of our various epistemological concepts leads us back again and again to our original analyses, where the new confirms the old, and the old the new" (Husserl 2001).

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Heidegger began as Husserl's assistant and envisioned protégé. He dedicated *Being and Time* to Husserl "with friendship and gratitude". Heidegger had a distinctive idea of phenomenology and was increasingly critical of Husserl as their professional relationship unfolded. He eventually broke with Husserl completely, joining the Nazi party and, as rector of Freiburg, excluding Husserl, and removing the dedication to Husserl from *Being and Time*. Heidegger's contextual and bearing are much different than Husserl's. Where Husserl was a mathematician by training, Heidegger was trained in theology and history of philosophy. Where Husserl was optimistic about the prospects of a rational foundation for all knowledge by way of analysis of pure consciousness, Heidegger came to distrust the very concept of consciousness and the relations and categories of Western philosophy more generally. He promoted the "destroying the history of ontology" (Heidegger 1962), and established a new vocabulary for describing human existence.

Rather than referring to human beings or conscious agents, for example, he refers to "*Dasein*", literally "there-being", which he defines as that being whose "being is an issue for it". Where Husserl emphasizes experiences of physical things like trees and ink blotters, Heidegger emphasizes what is meaningful in a person's life, that "for the sake of which" a person lives. The cup is rarely perceived as such, but is rather a tool, ready-to hand, there "in-order-to" provide refreshment and energy while writing or reading papers, which is something one does "for the sake of" being an academic. These more existential dimensions of everyday experience are Heidegger's emphasis in phenomenology. Heidegger takes up all the classical phenomenological themes – space, time, things, language, other persons, etc. – but always with new language and emphases, and with fascinating results. Heidegger's approach to phenomenology has been influential in philosophy of mind and cognitive science, especially via the work of Hubert Dreyfus and his students (Malpas 2000).

Some notable students of Husserl including Edith Stein and Aron Gurwitsch provides a concise analysis of a variety of phenomena related to contemporary discussions of social cognition and the problem of other minds (Goldman 2006). Further the links between Husserl's theory of meaning and the social world were taken up by Alfred Schutz, who integrated phenomenology with Max Weber's sociology. Husserl praised Schutz's *The Phenomenology of the Social World* (Schutz, 1967), which remains relevant in contemporary discussions of collective intentionality and inter-subjectivity (Chelstrom 2013). Husserl's influence on 20th century philosophy encompasses even further than this. Husserl's understanding of mind and consciousness, whether sympathetically elaborated upon or critically deconstructed, has thereby formed the basis of a great deal of 20th century philosophy.

PHENOMENOLOGY IN RELATION TO PHILOSOPHY OF MIND

The phenomenological tradition is related to the philosophy of mind in several broad ways. Phenomenology and philosophy of mind have a shared history that can be traced on 19th century thought and continued in to the 20th century. Philosophy of mind is generally considered to be part of analytic philosophy, and analytic philosophy originated in the same background as phenomenology, an "Anglo-Austrian tradition" (Dummett, 1993) encompassing Bolzano, Brentano, Frege, Husserl, and others. Husserl's early work is distinctively analytic in its quality and content. Husserl makes fine-grained distinctions, resolves equivocations and engages in the same issues of logic, language, and meaning as other early analytic philosophers. He was in close dialogue with Frege and his ideas were familiar to Russell and Wittgenstein.

Phenomenology continued to be interwoven with analytic philosophy during the period of logical positivism and the Vienna school (D.W. Smith 2013). Carnap took seminars with Husserl at Freiburg, and his foundational program was rooted in phenomenological considerations, an effort to stem all knowledge claims from an analysis of the given. Husserl has been called "Carnap's unknown master" (Haddock 2008). The verificationist idea that statements are meaningful only if they can be verified in immediate experience also has obvious affinities to phenomenology, since verification chains are themselves phenomenological constructs (McIntyre 1982)

There were also premonitions of the analytic/continental split in this period. According to Carnap's famous critique to Heidegger's account of the "nothing" as a paradigm example of nonsense where Carnap probably inherited his concept of nonsense from Husserl (Vrahimis 2011). In the same breadth Schlick vigorously disputed Husserl's idea that non-sensory intuition of essences is possible (Livingston 2002). Later, as behaviorism argued, the view that internal mental states don't exist or aren't responsive to observation took hold first among psychologists and then analytic philosophers like Wittgenstein. All indication of private conscious states became suspect as "the air was fastened with a certain suspicion of 'inner' mental states behind behavior and speech" (D.W. Smith and Thomasson

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2005). Unconcealed references to consciousness or worse, transcendental subjectivity were clearly out of the question by the middle of the 20th century as was the impenetrable, opaque style of prose associated with Heidegger and his followers.

Nonetheless, leading figures in early philosophy of mind, even in this period, maintained an interest in phenomenology. Ryle went to Freiburg to meet Husserl and study with Heidegger (Thomasson 2002), and then began his career at Oxford teaching phenomenology and related ideas. His first two publications were reviews of phenomenological texts. Over the course of his career Ryle wrote papers that focused entirely on the phenomenological tradition (Thomasson 2002). According to Ryle's conception of the scope and method of philosophy is due in large part to Brentano's and Husserl's influence. All three sharply distinguished the methods of empirical science from the methods of philosophy. All three thought of philosophy as a distinctive form of inquiry that should proceed independently of experimental results or inductive generalizations. Granting a proprietary form of conceptual analysis to philosophy was a bold move at that time. Several scholars felt the Viennese dichotomy 'Either Science or Nonsense' had too few 'ors' in it". Ryle's specific approach to conceptual analysis was influenced by Husserl.

In the *Logical Investigations*, Husserl described a method for identifying categories of meaning by asking which terms could be substituted in to a sentence without producing some form of nonsense. Ryle's concept of a category mistake seems to have been a direct application and broadening of this type of "nonsense detection" (more on this connection shortly), as do his efforts in The Concept of Mind to examine the logical relationships between different types of mental concepts, he himself described the book as "a sustained essay in phenomenology". Ryle's critique of Cartesianism and associated talk of inner mental states is clearly resonant with Heidegger, as is Ryle's method of ordinary language philosophy, which emphasizes everyday practice over theoretical reflection. Based on these and other observations Thomasson concludes that the very idea of analytic philosophy and its proper role and some of its characteristic methods owe more to phenomenology than is generally acknowledged.

One general source of Husserl's influence on 20th century philosophy of mind as already noted in the discussion of Ryle is his work on "pure grammar" in the fourth logical investigation. Husserl distinguishes word sequences that are formally ungrammatical for instance "a man and is" with word sequences that are grammatical but describe impossible situations for example "round square" or "wooden iron". The former are nonsense while the latter are countersense. Husserl's grammatical analyses influenced Ryle, Carnap, and, perhaps indirectly, Chomsky. As we noted, there is evidence that Carnap's concept of nonsense derived from Husserl, and it has also been suggested that *Logical Syntax of Language* was written under Husserl's influence (BarHillel, 1957). Ryle's account of category mistakes cases where one category is mixed with another incompatible one can plausibly be viewed as a refinement of Husserl's account of countersense (Thomasson 2002). Husserl's account of pure grammar is in some ways similar to Chomsky's linguistic theory.

Beyond these historical interconnections, phenomenology is related to philosophy of mind via concepts and tools that now have independent philosophical interest. Instances include formal ontology (the study of the basic categories of being that is object, property, fact, etc. and their interrelations (Smith 1998), facts (Mulligan and Correia 2013), and ontological dependence (Correia 2008). All of these originate in part in Husserl, and have become a standard part of the philosopher's metaphysical toolkit. These tools have been applied in various ways to philosophy of mind. Ontological dependence and formal ontology have been deployed in the literature on mental-physical relations like super-venience, dependence, and grounding (Correia and Schnieder, 2012).

Finally, there are many areas of direct thematic overlap between phenomenology and philosophy of mind. In these cases we find both the explicit application of insights from the phenomenological tradition to philosophy of mind, as well as more implicit traces of phenomenology both as tradition and method in pursuit of contemporary topics. Examples include the structure of intentionality (D.W. Smith and McIntyre 1982); the twin-earth thought experiment and semantic externalism (Beyer 2013); the overlap between Husserl and John Searle's philosophy of language, mind, and the social world (what some have called the "Searle in Husserl"); functionalism and artificial intelligence; first-person knowledge (Thomasson 2005), supervenience and metaphysics of mind (Yoshimi 2010); one-order and higher-order theories of consciousness (Kriegel 2009); representational theories of mind (Shim 2011); and non-conceptual content (Hopp 2010).

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PERCEPTUAL CONTENT

Suppose you enter a room with a round black dining table in the center. As you approach the table you are looking down at it from an oblique angle. Sunlight streams through an open window, creating variegated shades and tones across the surface of the table. What do you see? Or, to put the question differently, what is the content or your perceptual experience? On one hand, answering this question is straightforward: you see a table. On the other hand, it provokes further questions regarding how, precisely, one is aware of the table. For example, does the table look round? Or, given the angle of our perspective, does it appear elongated? Does it as being appear uniform shade of black? Or are you unaware of the blackness, since the sunlight presents the table as a multi-colored set of shades and tones? What is the relationship between what is phenomenally manifested in the experience and what the experience represents as being the case? These questions about content, representation, and phenomenal character are at the center of several live debates in contemporary philosophy of mind (Orlandi, 2012). Comparative to these debates, we believe that Husserl developed a fairly rich view, whereby perceptual experience is built up from multiple non-conceptual and conceptual layers. In what follows we distinguish four layers of perceptual experience: (1) what is intuitively given or "sensory manifest" in the experience; (2) an "immanent horizon" of felt associations; (3) a "counter-factual horizon" of ways we expect an object to be in relation to different movements with respect to it; and (4) a linguistically / conceptually-mediated division of "active" and "predicative" understandings of things.

According to Husserl's interpretation, objects dominate experience. He argues that we live through perceptions, but experience things that is his emphasis on constitutive phenomenology, on how the objects that appear to us are constituted in experiential processes. This emphasis on objects is sometimes referred to as the "transparency" of consciousness (Kind, 2010). According to Lycan, "We normally see right through perceptual states to external objects and do not even notice that we are in perceptual states (Lycan 2014). For Husserl, as for many contemporary philosophers, this object-centered feature of experience can be described in terms of perceptual content. Husserl describes the content of an act as that part of it which prescribes what it represents or presents the object of my perception (Smith 2007) and specifies the object of perception. This object-prescribing content is distinct from the full experiential act that contains it, whose general phenomenology seems to outstrip the object-prescribing content. The content is also distinct from the actual object it refers to. As Husserl said in the Investigations that:

We must distinguish…between the object as it is intended [the intentional object] ... and the object which is intended [the actual object]. In each act an object is presented as determined in this or that manner… (Husserl 2001).

Although objects dominate experience, for Husserl, perceptual phenomenology is richer than the set of properties we represent as being instantiated by objects. There is a complex pattern of shading on the table as a result of the lighting. The multicolored shade which Husserl calls "intuitive content" are sensory manifest. Similarly, the selection of shape and color that occupies my visual field is, in terms of what is strictly manifest in this sensory manner. These features of perception are not what we initially focus on, but on reflection we can in some sense identify that the table was "viewed as" elongated, and as being colored in different shades due to lighting conditions and my spatial relation to it. Intuitive content, however, includes more than what is strictly sensory manifest.

Husserl, distinguishes non-intentional sensations or what he later calls "hyle", from an interpretive element that "animates" them. He makes this distinction using a variational method. The contribution made by the interpretive part of perception can be varied independently of what is sensory manifest, and vice versa. Thus, on the one hand, different patterns of sensation can yield the same perceptual sense you have of the table. As the lighting changes slightly, the same table appears. On the other hand, what is sensory manifest can remain the same as perceptual sense varies. For this circumstance, Husserl describes the interpretive shift that occurs when perceiving a figure in a wax museum initially as another person, and then as a wax figure or model (Husserl 2001). The shift is an experiential shift. The part that is different between these experiences is the part that exceeds their sensory character is the "interpretation", "act character", or "apprehension character" of the perceptual act. Husserl associates this apprehension character with several additional layers of structure in the perceptual act, which are in various ways conceptual and non-conceptual. To make these connections between Husserl's account of perceptual content and conceptual structures, we distinguish two senses of "conceptual".

In one sense, concepts are constituents of propositional contents that the substance of language and thought. If one thinks that the table is black, one does so in virtue of the concepts 'table' and 'black'. We call these "linguistically

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structured concepts”. In another sense, a concept is a kind of discriminative ability available to non-linguistic animals. Insofar as an animal can differentially respond to humans versus non-human objects, or to perishable versus unperishable food sources, animals have concepts in this sense (Margolis and Laurence, 2014). These we can rename it as “discriminative concepts”.

In considering the relation between both kinds of conceptual structure and the four layers of perceptual experience Husserl describes, first, the rich selection of sensory manifest properties e.g., the indirect array of multicolored descriptions and tones of our table-top is non-conceptual in both of our senses. We represent the table as being round, and a uniform shade of black. The richness of the sensory manifest selection far exceeding what the linguistically-structured concept “black table” prescribes. When we think “black table” we are thinking at a level of generality that, according to Husserl’s account, it is consistent with many different intuitive contents, many different ways an actual table could be given (Hopp 2010). Moreover, a well-trained dog may possess a discriminative concept of table in virtue of which it treats this table in the same manner as it treats other tables. This discriminative concept is compatible with many different ways the table can be sensory manifest to the dog. So intuitive content is discriminatively non-conceptual. Secondly, there is a kind of penumbra of felt associations between the concurrently manifest profile of an object and further possible profiles of the object which is an “immanent horizon”. This is the level of passively synthesized incentives, which develop via passive genesis. This penumbra of incentives is phenomenally manifested according to Husserl and contributes to how we take the object to be, but also exceeds what can be given in any kind of conceptualized experience. The incentive relations that comprise this division of experience are developed in Husserl’s early analyses in the Logical Investigations, and later in his lectures on Active and Passive Synthesis (Husserl 2001). He describes them as a kind of experienced indication relation, a species of association (Walsh 2013). He is explicit, however, that this is not to be understood in terms of Hume’s discussion of discrete impressions causally triggering subsequent impressions.

The phenomenal character of “felt-belonging” connects the phenomenal features of a momentary perceptual profile of a table to those subsequent profiles that are most imminent in the temporal flow of experience, i.e. what Husserl calls “adumbrations” or “protentions” (Husserl 2001. The immanent horizon or penumbra of the perception of the table includes the subtly felt expectation of how the object will continue to appear in the visual field based on my movements and the position of my eyes, head, and chest relative to it. As with intuitive content, the penumbra does not rely on linguistically-structured concepts. A dog need not have any concept of a table in order to experience this kind of felt penumbra of associations. Subsequently the immanent horizon is linguistically non-conceptual whether it is discriminatively non-conceptual is less clear. The next level of “counter-factual” horizon structure further unpacks what apprehension character is, that is, what changes when we go from seeing an object as a model to seeing it as a human. The horizon of an experience of a thing is the set of additional possible experiences of that thing, which extends in infinitely many directions in a systematically and firmly rule-governed manner, and in each direction without end (Husserl 2014). That is, our overall understanding of a thing can be understood in terms of rule-governed patterns connecting how we interact with a thing with how we expect it to respond. When you see the figure first as a human then as a model, this shift in representational content can be explicated by analyzing the way the horizon of the experience changes. If we see a model, we expect it not to move, to have a specific feel when we touch it. If we see a human, we expect the skin to give, and be warmer. We expect a living person to move and notice me. These expectations extend in infinitely many directions and “without end”, and can thus be thought of as systems of counterfactuals describing chains of possible interactions and expected experiences (Yoshimi 2009).

Counter-factual horizon structures are linguistically non-conceptual, but discriminatively conceptual. Horizon structure does not require that we have linguistic concepts. For instance, a dog approaching the model need not possess the linguistically-structured concept “model” in order to take this object to be one thing and then another thing. Thus, horizons are in that sense non-conceptual (Hopp 2010). However, horizons are conceptual insofar as concepts are discriminative structures. The dog has a specific set of expectations when it approaches what it takes to be a human. When it begins to suspect it is not a real person, and just an inanimate object, it will activate a different set of expectations and thereby behave differently. These features of experience are clearly part of the content of an act that the full accuracy conditions for an act must specify how we expect it to be but are not phenomenally present in the same way intuitive contents and the penumbra of incentives are. Accordingly, we have a subtle layer of meaning: that is the layer of content that is in one sense conceptual, in another sense non-conceptual. This layer is important for analyzing the representational content of experience in that it is essential for understanding the relation between what is phenomenally manifest in the experience and one’s dispositions. It is not, however, part of the concurrent

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phenomenal character of the experience in the same manner as the intuitively given content and the immanent horizon of incentives. This counter-factual horizon of expectations is far too detailed to reasonably be included in the phenomenology of an experience.

Finally, Husserl describes a layer of structure which is explicitly conceptual in the linguistic sense. This is a layer of predicative structures, which is engaged when we talk and think about things. When we compare them, explicate their properties, re-count them to other things, read about them, and so forth (Hopp 2010). We learn about the history of models, we compare it in terms of their weight, age, and cost. We also talk to someone who worked with models in a warehouse. In these ways we create layers or sediments of linguistic conceptual structure on top of the pre-given object, which is already endowed with the more passive motivational and horizon structures as earlier described. Whereas many animals may possess the nonlinguistic discriminative concepts described, it is plausible that only human perceptual experience includes this kind of explicitly conceptual divisions. It is in virtue of the former that both the dog and human share a counter-factual horizon of expectations regarding how we expect the model to behave as we move around it, but it is in virtue of the latter that we, and not the dog, experience the model as a cultural object of a specific kind. These sedimented predicative structures have their own kind of horizons and motivation relations, that is the "arithmetical horizon" (Husserl 2014), the space of possible thoughts about numbers and transitions between these thoughts. Thus, Husserl acknowledges and, in our view, expands on the considerations that drive conceptualism (Brewer 1999) what is given in perception must be able to connect in an appropriate way with the space of reasons, the logical space of language and thought.

THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM

Although the issue of perceptual content in relation to phenomenology has been explored in some depth, there is a largely unexplored area of overlap between phenomenology and the mind-body problem, which we will briefly describe here. Husserl, develops what can be called a "phenomenology of the mind-body problem" or more, a "phenomenology of the metaphysics of mind". Moderately than directly questioning what mental states and physical states are, and how they are related, he questions how people experience mental states, physical states, and their relationship (Yoshimi 2010). That is, he considers how mental states, physical states, and mental-physical relationships are themselves constituted in the flux of experience. Husserl's phenomenology of the mind-body problem does not decide the philosophical issues, but rather sheds light on the space of possibilities available for philosophical consideration. Husserl's phenomenology can be viewed as a kind of transcendental or eidetic analysis of the mind-body problem, a framework within which any analysis of mind-body relations must unfold where essences are necessary constraints on the appearance of a given class of objects or processes (D. Kasmier 2003). According to Husserl's analysis, one can't have a position on the mind-body problem except relative to some prior experience of mind-body relations, and these experiences are constrained by certain eidetic structures. Empirical considerations further restrict the space of possible mind-body relations (Husserl 2014). Eidetic and empirical considerations together determine what types of mind-body relationships are compatible with our way of experiencing the world together with what we know about how the world works. Another time, this does not decide the philosophical issues, but rather helps delineate what the space of possible philosophical positions on the mind-body problem is for creatures like us.

According to Husserl, we experience sensations as arising from physical processes (Husserl 1989). He calls this an "experience of psycho-physical conditionality" (Husserl 1989) or "physiological dependences" (*physiologische Abhängigkeiten*). For example, we know that running an object over the surface of the skin produces a determinate succession of sensing, which can be repeated that, If an object moves mechanically over the surface of my skin, touching it, then I obviously have a succession of sensing ordered in a determinate way" ((Husserl 1989). He calls this a "phenomenal if…then". If the body is put in a certain state, then certain phenomenal states will arise. Husserl also notes that we do not always understand how these experienced meta-physical connections or "conditionalities" work. We just have an understanding that somehow there is such a relationship. Husserl describes a phenomenological form of supervenience between sensory states and physical states (Yoshimi 2012). He states that we experience the physical states of organisms as determining their sensory states. If two experienced agents or "animate organisms" are experienced as physically indiscernible, they will also be experienced as mentally imperceptible.

Consequently, sensations are experienced as supervening on physical processes. If two agents are experienced as having the same physical properties, they will also be experienced as having the same "stratum of sensation" (sensory

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properties). Other phenomenological features are experienced as supervening on physical states of the brain, including "phantasy" (which includes imagination and memory), feelings, instincts, and "the proper character, the rhythm, of higher consciousness" (Husserl 1989). Thus far we have a picture of mind-body relations that is similar to a standard contemporary physicalist conception. According to this picture, mental properties are related to physical properties via synchronic "vertical" supervenience relations. Physical processes are related by dynamic or "horizontal" causal processes, where one state of the brain gives rise to successive states, relative to an environment and a set of physical laws. The lower-level dynamics then induce higher level dynamics through the supervenience relations (Yoshimi 2012).

On the basis of this overall picture of mental-physical relations, many contemporary philosophers deny that true mental causation is possible (Yoshimi 2012). All apparent fundamental processes are ultimately driven by bottom-level physical processes; the appearance of mental interconnection is an epiphenomenon. This has come to be known as the "causal exclusion argument" (D. Kasmier 2003) think of low-level process "excluding" high level process from doing anything (Kim 2007). This argument has been addressed by physicalists in a variety of ingenious ways, which seek to preserve mental causation in a physicalist framework (Bennett 2008). However, although we experience many mental properties as being fixed by physical properties, it is not strong that we experience all mental properties as being fixed by physical properties (Husserl 1980). On behalf of some mental phenomena Husserl thinks it is unclear whether there is an assumed physical basis, and concludes that it is an empirical question which mental phenomena are experienced as having a physical basis and which aren't obviously, how far all this extends can only be decided empirically and if possible, by means of experimental psychology (Husserl 1989). He goes on to a give an argument that some properties relating to time-consciousness must not supervene on physical processes (Yoshimi 2010). Husserl thus defends a form of partial supervenience, the idea that some, but not all mental properties are fixed by an agent's physical properties. This variant on the supervenience relation is novel to Husserl's account, and is of some independent philosophical interest (Yoshimi 2010).

As an illustration, Husserl refers to "the voluntary production of hallucinations" (Husserl 1989) where, presumably, we first imagine something, and the brain then enters an appropriate state to support that imagination. Husserl similarly considers the possibility of temporal implication between brain states and the mental states they give rise to, describing it as unclear "whether or not the Objective temporal point of the cerebral stimulation, corresponding to the movement of the hand, must be taken as the same identical temporal point of the sensation" (Husserl 1989). He goes on to trace the source of this unclarity in the more fundamental problem of determining what the time of conscious states is that is "Everything depends on the way of defining the temporal point of a determinate state of consciousness" (Husserl 1989). Husserl's instincts were right by the timing of conscious events has emerged as a difficult but important topic, in the wake of Libet's pioneering work on the neuroscience of free will, and in particular his controversial method for measuring the time of conscious intentions (Libet, 2009). Although downward causation and temporal drift are unpopular today, they have been endorsed by proponents of strong appearance. Emergence in the philosophy of mind is a family of relations (O'Connor and Wong 2012). The strongest forms of emergence treat the mind as having some genuine autonomy from the physical level, and allow for temporal drift, downward causation, and vigorous mental causation (O'Connor and Wong 2005).

In addition to causing each other, physical states similarly cause other emergent mental states. Since the upwards mental-to-physical relation is "dynamic and causal" (Libet, 2009), some temporal drift can occur. Mental states can have causal effects of their own, both in terms of downward causation, and in terms of causation of other mental states. Their effects include directly determining aspects of the microphysical structure of the object as well as generating other emergent states. There is no problem of causal exclusion in this framework where mental causation is alive and well, alongside physical-to-physical and physical-to-mental causation. The view naturally couples with property dualism and agent causal views of the will. An agent's free choices have a direct causal impact on other mental states and on physical states.

Therefore, within the space of possibilities left open by Husserl's analysis of the essences of experienced physical bodies, mental states, and mental-physical interrelationships, existing theories have occupied many of the available adverts. Experimental philosophy could supplement Husserl's eidetic analyses with controlled studies of intuitions in these domains. Empirical work measuring mind-brain correlations could further constrain the space of open possibilities. Perhaps these zig-zagging analyses would lead us to new, unexplored regions of the space of possible solutions to the mind-body problem.

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CONCLUSION

We have seen that phenomenology and philosophy of mind understood both as philosophical disciplines and as historical traditions are interrelated in a complex, dynamic way. As historical civilizations, they were at one time joined, later diverged, and are coming back together in a larger swarm-like pattern, characterized by local spinning of overlap and mutual reinforcement, irregular skirmishes, and shared new directions. Although it is impossible to detail all the integrative possibilities in a single article, we have tried to mark out some promising areas, and to illustrate how further collaborations might unfold the possible solutions to the mind-body problem.

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